



CENTRO DE INTEGRIDADE PÚBLICA
Anticorrupção - Transparência - Integridade

Prospects for Governance in 2023: 10 Risks should be Monitored in Election Year in Mozambique



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Note from the Director

The year 2023 marks the beginning of another electoral cycle, with the holding of the municipal elections in October, which are the prelude to the general elections that will be held in 2024. Given the history of electoral competition, the municipal elections will be those which arouse most interest among the voters and the political parties. On the front line will be the municipalities of Beira, Nampula, Quelimane and Nacala. These are currently governed by the opposition and the Frelimo Party wants to win them back.



One of the great unknowns will be the emergence or not of civic groups which can compete, particularly in the municipal elections, due to the almost general discredit into which political parties have fallen.

The elections are also a moment of tension within parties, because the choice of candidates shows the level of alliances and political trust between the party leaderships and the grass roots. These elections will also be occurring at a moment when the ruling party is going through moments of great tension between the former President of the Party and of the Republic, Armando Guebuza, and the incumbent, Filipe Nyusi.

The case of the hidden debts is the greatest cause for the visibility of this tension. It may concentrate a great part of the attentions of the current President, of his government and its main allies, relegating to a secondary position measures that should be implemented for the economic recovery of the country, and which could probably increase the political gains of the ruling party.

Hence it is credible that measures for economic revival such as PAE (Economic Acceleration Plan), will be put on the back burner in a scenario of strong struggles for control of the party between the pro-Nyusi and pro-Guebuza factions. The struggles between the factions will sharpen, above all, in order to influence the choice of the heads of list for the municipal elections, and also for nominating the candidate to succeed Nyusi (if there is no constitutional amendment allowing Nyusi to run for a third term of office).

These disputes may take the focus away from crucial aspects of governance, such as the above-mentioned Plan, but also the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado, the National Development Strategy for the next 25 years, the questions linked to the extractive industry, as well as a serious and inclusive debate on what is desired from the Sovereign Wealth Fund, the announced sovereign insurance against natural disasters and the uncertainties about the Single Wage Table (TSU).

The history of economic policy in Mozambique shows that in the final two years before the end of a term of office, the top-ranking public servants focus on seeking to position themselves before the winds of change. Hence, crucial decisions in the management of the public administration are delayed because it is not known what “the new chiefs” may think or want. This is a dominant characteristic of the discontinuity in the formulation of public policies which is typical of Mozambican political reality.

So, if the hypotheses listed above are confirmed, we shall have a Frelimo which could arrive at the October elections very fragmented and weakened by its poor performance at the level of the central government, which may have effects on how the voters decide to vote, either by abstaining, or by voting for the opposition, depending on the performance of opposition candidates locally. The reforms introduced with the new Single Wage Table have stirred up tensions and conflicts within one of the main support groups of the ruling party, the state employees and agents. The prospects for the year which is now beginning show enormous challenges for the recovery of the Mozambican economy, in a scenario of intense disputes and conflicts within the actions of the party with government responsibility, which could be a determinant factor for the political, economic, and social instability of the country.

Edson Cortez, PhD

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Edson Cortez".

Executive Director of the Centre for Public Integrity

Introduction

About a third of Mozambican voters should vote on 11 October this year, to choose their local leaders. The elections are an opportunity to deepen democracy, by giving citizens the opportunity to choose their leaders.

However, in one of the most corrupt countries in the world and governed by a regime classified as authoritarian, holding elections is frequently used as a mechanism for the political leaders to appropriate resources of the State for private purposes, to increase the repression of fundamental freedoms, to manipulate the way democratic institutions operate, and to present electoralist government programmes which will never be implemented.

Major corruption scandals in Mozambique are linked to illicit political financing – specifically, of election campaigns of the ruling party. There is evidence that some of the money from the bribes related with the contracting of the hidden debts was used to finance the election campaign of the Frelimo Party and its presidential candidate, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, in 2014. The former Minister of Labour, Maria Helena Taipo, confessed that she diverted money from the public treasury to finance the election campaign of the Frelimo Party and its candidate.

In Zambézia, the Frelimo Party ordered the illegal logging and export of timber to finance its 2014 election campaign. Large companies in Maputo, Nampula and Beira import various merchandise, using customs exemptions granted illicitly by the Tax Authority of Mozambique and then use part of the money, which should have paid taxes to the State, to finance the ruling party.

In election periods, political power tends to increase control and limit the work of state institutions, the mass media and civil society. In extreme cases, there are even assassinations of activists and election observers, as was seen in the case of Anastácio Matavel, killed by police agents on the eve of elections, a situation which had a negative effect on election observation in the critical province of Gaza.

The present document presents the 10 areas of governance most relevant for monitoring in 2023, the year which opens the election cycle in Mozambique. It is the result of documentary research and was drawn up by a multi-disciplinary team of researchers from the Centre of Public Integrity (CIP), including economists, jurists, political scientists, specialists in public procurement, and investigative journalists. The focus of the analysis is on the areas of Public Finance, Anti-corruption, Public Procurement, electoral crimes and violence, and gender balance in the context of elections.

CIP hopes that the document it draws up at the start of each fiscal year will be used by civil society, the media, cooperation partners and citizens in general as an instrument for monitoring governance (the drafting and implementation of public policies) throughout the year.

1. Public Finance: Economically difficult year with a risk of manipulating macro-economic indicators for electoral purposes

While the year 2022 may be regarded as historic for the global economy, with high levels of inflation and interest rates – fuel prices reached a historic maximum, exceeding 130 USD a barrel, with direct effects on Mozambique - 2023 will be a year that inherits the various macro-economic oscillations recorded in 2022.

High inflation and interest rates, the energy and food crises stimulated by the war between Russia and Ukraine are factors which prevented countries from reaching the macro-economic targets forecast in 2022. For 2023, the World Bank revised downwards the levels of economic growth, from 3% to 1.7%.

Mozambique envisaged economic growth of 5%, after growth of 4.37% in the first six months of 2022. This forecast is based on the extractive industry, a sector which is highly dependent on external shocks.

Taking into account the above-mentioned factors, and the downwards forecast of world economic growth, associated with the fact that this is an election year, 2023 may be regarded as a difficult year. It is expected that 2023 will be a year in which the consequences of the oscillations of these economics variables and of the monetary policy measures are reflected, including the impact on employment, such as an increase in unemployment, due to high interest rates.

The electoral context brings the risk of the use of public resources to finance campaigns, or simply for the individual use of leaders. It is a period in which macro-economic policies may be manipulated so as to make the government look apparently competent, and thus gain an advantage at the ballot box.

1.1 Risk of manipulation of the macro-economic variables in election periods

Macro-economic variables, such as inflation, unemployment, income and expenditure are highly vulnerable to manipulation in election periods. The politicians and executives of the Government implement measures that deviate from the economically optimal in order to achieve success in the elections. In these cases, they manipulate the variables which are most visible to society, with the sole aim of being apparently “viewed well” in society, and thus increase the chances of re-election.


The voters are increasingly attentive and looking for results, which ensures that the politicians do not use policies that displease the public on the eve of elections, such as tax increases, limitations on admissions, etc.

The employment variable has been commonly used in election periods. The levels of unemployment may grow throughout the term of office, but at the end of the term, politicians tend to reduce unemployment, at least numerically – even with theory indicating that the reduction of unemployment not associated with an increase in production could create inflationary pressures in the short term.

1.2 Inflation forecasts

The year 2022 was marked by high annual inflation which reached a maximum of 12.96% in August. The graph below shows the inflation levels in 2020, 2021 and 2022. One can note that in 2022 inflation exceeded the target of one digit.

Graph 1: annual inflation for 2020, 2021 and 2022 (in %)



Source: INE. Annual inflation 2020 to 2022

For 2023, a level of inflation of about 11.5% is expected, which is higher than the observed figure of 10.91% for 2022. This forecast is in line with the international forecasts which indicate for 2023 a worsening trend for the price of fuel and foodstuffs.


However, the fiscal pressure of an election year and the growing expenditure with the Single Wage Table and the Economic Acceleration Package (PAE), which will be implemented this year, not to mention the natural disasters which strike Mozambique regularly, could restrict economic growth and increase inflation.

Nonetheless, since it is an election year, the makers of public policies will do all they can to keep inflation at controlled levels, as a way of showing apparent competence of the government of the day and in this way achieve better election results.

1.3 Increase in public expenditure in the election period

The pressure on the budget increases in election periods – particularly staff expenditure. Analysing the period from 2010 to 2019, (a period which includes two elections), one can note that the levels of public expenditure, both current and capital expenditure, tend to increase, and these increases are more significant in election years. Graph 2 shows the trend for growth in expenditure – running costs, capital expenditure and staff costs.

Graph 2: Running costs, capital expenditure and staff costs, 2010 to 2019 (in billions MT)



(running costs, capital expenditure, staff)

Source: RPCGE 2010 to 2019


When the analyses are broken down by periods, they show the growing trend of expenditure in election periods.

For the period from 2010 to 2015 one may note that running costs, capital expenditure and staff costs increased less between 2010 and 2012 and more in 2013 and 2014 (years of the municipal and presidential elections respectively).

From 2010 to 2011 running costs increased by 11.5 billion MT and from 2011 to 2012 the costs increased by 12,9 billion MT, an average growth of around 13%, while in 2014 the running costs increased by 22.8%.

Capital expenditure shows the same growing trend, with a greater amount in 2014. From 2010 to 2011 capital expenditure increased by 0.4 billion meticaís, and from 2011 to 2012 by 4.5 billion. From 2013 to 2014 capital expenditure increased by more than twice the amount of the previous years - about 11.4 billion meticaís. As shown in graph 3B

Graph 3 A: variations in running costs between 2010 and 2014 (in billions MT)



Source: RPCGE 2010 to 2014

Capital expenditure financed by internal sources increased significantly in 2019, the year of general elections. The expenditure financed by internal sources increased from 32.9 billion MT in 2018 to 44.7 billion MT in 2019, a rise of about 36%. Taking into account the levels of growth of the periods prior to the elections and keeping the rest constant (*ceteris paribus*), one can state that in election periods there is a trend to increase government expenditure, mainly in the component financed internally.

The Report and Opinion on the General State Account (RPCGE - 2016) drawn up by the Administrative Tribunal (TA) shows that in the years 2013 and 2014 expenditure grew by 25.4% and 24.6% (the two years at the end of the term of office) but in 2016 expenditure recorded a decline of 11.7%.

The same document also shows that in the five-year period, 2012-2016, the year 2014 (election year) was the year in which most capital expenditure was reported, reaching a weight of 72.8 % of total investment expenditure. In 2012 the weight was 60,7%.

Table 1 shows the detail of public expenditure in the 2015 to 2019 period. From this, one can note that the running costs and the capital expenditure increased above the average for the previous years with the exception of external investment as a result of the cuts in financing that the country suffered due to the hidden debts.

Table 1: running costs, capital expenditure and staff costs in the 2015 to 2019 period (in billions of MT)

| Expenditure | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2015/2016 | 2016/2017 | 2017/2018 | 2018/2019 |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Running costs | 117.8 | 141.1 | 148.7 | 178.2 | 195.8 | 23.3 | 7.6 | 29.5 | 17,6 |
| Capital expenditure Total | 64.1 | 50.3 | 54.4 | 67.2 | 72.1 | -13.8 | 4.1 | 12,8 | 4,9 |
| Capital expenditure internal | 42.7 | 23.6 | 23.1 | 32.9 | 44.7 | -191 | -0.5 | 9,8 | 11,8 |
| External capital expenditure | 21.4 | 26.6 | 31.3 | 34.2 | 27.3 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 2,9 | -6,9 |
| Staff | 64.3 | 77.8 | 85.1 | 96.5 | 112.3 | 13.5 | 7.3 | 11,4 | 15,8 |

Source: RPCGE 2015 to 2019

1.4 Risk of granting undue fiscal benefits

Mozambique's structure of resources is focused mainly on direct taxes (IRPC and IRPS) and on indirect taxes (IVA, ICE), showing the country's dependence on the business sector and on waged labour. This fact puts achieving the targets at risk when a favourable business environment is not created.

Since this is an election year, and given the dependency of the Government on the resources of private companies,


the companies could check whether pressure from the Government to collect revenue might focus on particular companies that are not allied to the ruling party while the companies that are allied could benefit from exemptions and favouritism which imply paying fewer taxes.

For this not to happen, in 2023 it is necessary to step up audits by the Administrative Tribunal and by the General Inspectorate of Finance, in order to identify the companies benefitting from fiscal exemptions and benefits, and analysing the legality of how these benefits were obtained.

Recent cases of tax evasion by means of fiscal exemptions show that the country has lost millions of meticaais of revenue. This shows the urgent need to raise the discussion on fiscal exemptions and benefits at all levels, from the fiscal benefits granted to companies exploiting natural resources to the tax exemptions granted to private companies, to public officials, to deputies of the Assembly of the Republic, and to political parties, among others.

The graph 4 below shows the total fiscal benefits granted in the 2012-2021 period. From this we can see that in 9 years the fiscal benefits tripled, from 13.2 billion MT to 34.1 billion MT.

Graph 4: Fiscal benefits 2012 to 2021



Source: RPCGE 2015 to 2019

The table 2 below shows the details of the fiscal benefits from which one can note that in election years the fiscal benefits grow much more than in the preceding years. Exemption from VAT on imports is an example: in 2017, the state granted exemptions of six billion MT and in 2019 the exemptions increased to 12.7 billion. The same can be noted for the consumption tax, where in 2017 exemptions amounted to 0.4 billion MT, and in 2019 exemptions more than tripled to 1.9 billion.

Table 2: fiscal benefits from 2012 to 2019 (in billions MT)

| Years | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Customs Duties | 2,4 | 3,9 | 3,5 | 6,4 | 4,7 | 3,5 | 4,4 | 5,6 |
| Tax on specific consumption – imported goods | 0,07 | 0,3 | 0,2 | 0,2 | 0,2 | 0,4 | 0,3 | 1,9 |
| VAT on imports | 6 | 9,4 | 9,4 | 17,1 | 10,8 | 6 | 7,6 | 12,7 |

Source: RPCGE 2021 and 2014

1.5 Need for greater Budgetary Transparency

Mozambique has been mentioned internationally as a country with insufficient levels of budgetary transparency. The difficulty in obtaining information, and the lack of mechanisms for greater participation and monitoring of the budget by the public ensure that the country has a low score in the research on open budgets (Open Budget Survey - OBS) held since 2006.

The research showed in 2021 that the Government was not managing efficiently and transparently the fiscal package to face the Covid-19 pandemic.¹ This fact was later confirmed by the Administrative Tribunal. In 2022, the budgetary transparency indices show that Mozambique remains with levels below what would be desired².

Since 2023 is an election year, when politicians and public servants will do all in their power to guarantee their re-election, it is common for levels of budgetary transparency to be lower. The government tends to make access to information difficult, and it becomes necessary for society to be more vigilant, active and demanding in order to reduce the asymmetry of information³ between the executive and the public.

Public managers hold the information in terms of execution of the budget. They should share the information so that the public can have access to the way in which public money was spent. However, given the asymmetry of information between the Government and the public, when the public is not aware of the Government's real expenditure, advocacy becomes more difficult.

The manipulation of information, and the late publication of budgetary documents ensure that the public does not have access to the information and is not aware of the actions of the government, thus limiting the analysis of the reader for later choice.

It is recommended that the Assembly of the Republic draw up a bill on fiscal responsibility under which public managers would be forbidden from increasing public expenditure and debt in election periods, prejudicing future governments and the economy.

2. State Business Sector: Risk of using the Assets of State-Owned Companies to Finance Election Campaigns

The election cycle may interfere in the financial and operational performance of the public companies, because the ruling party could exert pressure on the company managers to finance the party, including its election campaign. Studies by Harymawan *et al.* (2020)⁴, on “*How does the presidential election period affect the performance of the state-owned enterprise in Indonesia?*”, show that the State-owned companies tend to record a decay in financial performance in pre-election periods, and reveal that the composition of the management bodies of these companies is more political than professional. This is also the case in Mozambique. The appointment of managers of public companies, based on political trust, makes it possible to facilitate the use of these companies for political purposes, including financing the election campaign. In Mozambique, paragraph 4 of article 19 of Law No. 7/91 of 23 January, which sets out the legal framework for the formation and activity of political parties, declares that “*State bodies, persons in public law and collective persons in private law and of public utility are forbidden from financing or subsidizing political parties, with the exception of the sums included in the General State Budget for this purpose.*”

The direct ban on the bodies announced in the Law, which includes the public companies, essentially seeks to reduce the risk of donations with counterparts.

According to Ufen *et al.* (2015)⁵, the donations from public companies may be voluntary or not. The non-voluntary donations originate from pressures from the parties, generally from the ruling party. In these cases, the company management has little chance of refusing requests for support of this nature. In Mozambique, cases of this sort are common. The most well-known is the case of Aeroportos de Moçambique, in which the Chairperson of the company’s Board of Directors diverted funds to finance political activities of the Frelimo Party, as was proved in court⁶.

However, it is difficult to detect these facts, since, although they influence the company’s results, they may be mixed with its poor operational and financial performance. This fact is made worse in countries with a low level of auditing of the accounts of the public companies, including their publication. For the case of voluntary donations, the authors argue that, although some donations by public companies are voluntary, motivated by a sense of public duty on the part of the company, they many also imply expectations of assistance in the future, which could generate conflicts of interests, bias in public functions and corruption.

Hence, although the Law bans financing, Government control by the ruling party could generate pressures for the public companies to finance or make some of their assets available to finance the party’s campaign and thus influence the election results. Although in theory this type of risk is highly probable, it is difficult to monitor, due to the difficulty in access to financial information from the public companies, and the distortion of accounting information, among other factors.

3. Extractive Industry: risk of diverting revenue from the extractive sector to finance elections

The Economic and Social Plan and the State Budget (PESOE) for 2023 envisages that the extractive industry will lead the growth in GDP with a growth rate of 23.1%. This will be supported by increased production of rubies, coal, heavy sands (ilmenite, zircon and rutile), natural gas (with the start of exports from the Coral Sul project) and building materials.

However, these forecasts seem to have ignored some risks associated with this sector, namely, alterations in the exchange rate, in the global prices of gas, and in levels of production due to various factors that are not under Government control. In addition, since this is an election year, there is the risk of diverting revenue from the sector to finance the 2023 and 2024 election agendas, just as happened in the 2019 elections with the money from the capital gains⁷.

Although it is expected that in 2023 the increased demand for liquefied natural gas will raise growth in Mozambique⁸, the uncertainties about the dynamic of the prices of energy products in 2023 represent a high risk for attaining the growth rate of 23.1% projected by the Government.

The classification of the risk of not attaining this target as a high risk is tied to the forecasts for 2023 which indicate that the average prices for the extractive products, notably for liquefied natural gas (LNG) may remain relatively high in comparison with the prices of the last decade, but relatively lower than those recorded in 2022⁹.


Graph 5: Forecast price of natural gas for 2023 (USD)



Source: World Bank, 2023

The projections made by the Government, although they follow this trend, were based on older data (projections made in April 2022), which were more optimistic than the revisions made in January 2023¹⁰. Hence, the Government's projections in PESOE should be viewed cautiously (see Graph 6).

Graph 6: Price of natural gas (forecast of April 2022)




Source: World Bank. April 2022

3.1 Limitations on financing and natural disasters may affect the sector's production

The gradual economic recovery that took place in 2022, with the international market opening a little more to the trade in mineral resources, after the most critical phase of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the steps taken by the mining companies which resumed, albeit gradually, their pace of production, motivated the Government to revise upwards its forecasts for the production of extractive products with a great weight in the overall structure of State revenue, namely gas, gold, heavy sands (ilmenite, zircon and rutile), graphite, rubies and coal.

As can be seen from Graph 7, the gas from the Rovuma Basin, from the Coral Sul project, will show the largest growth, with 239%, followed by rubies (60%) and graphite (48%). The Temane gas will show lower growth, of only 2%. The forecast for the growth of the gas from the Rovuma Basin does not include the production of gas condensate which had not been envisaged in PESOE 2022, but for 2023 there are now forecasts for the production of this gas, of about 979.915 barrels (BBL).

Graph 7: Growth in production of the extractive products with greatest weight in State revenue in 2023 (%)



Source: PESOE 2022 and 2023

However, considering that the production of the extractive sector may be affected: *i)* by the availability and costs of financing; *ii)*

politico-military instability in the region where the investment is being made; and *iii*) general operational risks, it can be said, based on the current conjuncture, that there is a high risk that the production of the sector in 2023 will be affected, and with it the level of income forecast.

- i. **Availability and costs of financing** – the global inflation trends have led governments to adopt more restrictive monetary policies and this will reduce the availability and increase the cost of financing, whose effects may be reflected in production¹¹. Production may even occur, but the forecast revenues may come later than the initial forecast.
- ii. **Political instability in the region where the investment takes place** – instability in the province of Cabo Delgado has already proven to be a risk that should not be ignored when forecasting production in this sector. In 2022, ruby and graphite exploration projects were forced to suspend activities due to the expansion of the war to the southern region of the province¹², which affected the expected production. In this sense, despite the advances reported by public entities in relation to the security situation in the region, while the insurgency persists, the Government must make its projections with some caution, especially for projects located in areas of imminent conflict.
- iii. **General operational risks** – The National Institute of Meteorology (INAM) warned that the country could be affected by up to ten cyclones, of which five could have devastating consequences. Given that most mining companies operate in locations vulnerable to climate effects, cyclones can negatively affect the level of production.

3.2 Lack of transparency of the data made publicly available

PESOE 2023 indicates that the State could gather revenue in 2023, of 357,063.8 million MT. Of this sum, 1,250.2 million MT, about 0.4% of the State revenue, is revenue from the natural gas of Area 4 of the Rovuma Basin. In the entire PESOE document, despite a specific chapter on the extractive sector, there is no reference to the value of the total revenue from the sector, only to one specific project.

Failure to make available the data of the revenue which could be obtained from the entire sector, apart from violating the principles of transparency which should characterise this sector, raises serious suspicions about the real values later declared as the revenue from the sector.

The Government has approved the bill for the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund that will be financed by revenue from this sector. Hence, information about the revenues forecast is of extreme importance. Since this is an election year, this lack of transparency may lead to the values that have not been declared publicly to be used for electoral purposes.

Furthermore, the data for the forecast production referring to 2022 written into PESOE 2022 and those presented in PESOE 2023 differ significantly, raising doubts about the credibility of the information made publicly available about the sector. See the table below for the data on the extractive products that have a great weight in the overall structure of the State revenue.

Unless there was a corrective PESOE in 2022, the data should have been the same. This example shows the high risk of lack of credibility of the information made available, which could lead to manipulation of production and revenue data, for purposes foreign to those approved in the budgetary documents.

Table 3: Data on the production of extractive products for 2022

| Designação | Unidade | Dados de 2022 (PESOE 2022) | Dados de 2022 (PESOE 2023) | Diferença (2023-2022) |
|----------------------|---------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Ouro (Kg) | Kg | 705,00 | 1.087,40 | 382,40 |
| Ilmenite (Ton) | Ton | 2.120.000,00 | 2.170.462,00 | 50.462,00 |
| Zircão (Ton) | Ton | 130.000,00 | 123.018,00 | (6.982,00) |
| Rutilo (Ton) | Ton | 9.000,00 | 8.080,00 | (920,00) |
| Grafite (Ton) | Ton | 160.000,00 | 182.024,00 | 22.024,00 |
| Rubi (Cts) | Cts | 6.630.000,00 | 4.411.374,40 | (2.218.625,60) |
| Carvão Mineral (Ton) | Ton | 12.274.536,00 | 13.245.848,00 | 971.312,00 |
| Gas natural (Temane) | Gj | 180.056.625,00 | 177.248.565,70 | (2.808.059,30) |
| Condensado (Temane) | bbl | 645.085,00 | 265.413,70 | (379.671,30) |
| LNG (Rovuma) | mscf | 56.000,00 | - | (56.000,00) |
| Condensado (Rovuma) | bbl | - | - | - |

Source: PESOE 2022 and PESOE 2023

3.3 Kimberley Process Management Unit (UGPK): risk of becoming a “slush fund”

One of the assumptions for the growth of the extractive sector indicated by the Government concerns making operational the Kimberley Process Management Unit (UGPK). Its technical procedures for screening the production and sale of precious metals and gems will make it possible to gauge the real production and recovery of undeclared data. In 2023, screening will be intensified to maximise the collection of data on production by companies and in artisanal mining.

The forecast of the contribution of the UGPK to the growth of the sector presents a high risk. It is indeed hoped that making the UGPK operational will contribute significantly towards gathering more revenue for the State, from the exploitation of precious metals and gems in industrial and artisanal mining. However, success is partly dependent on the existence of an organised and registered artisanal sector, which will facilitate screening by the UGPK.

However, although the first census of artisanal miners was launched in August 2021, to date no results from this census are publicly known, although at the time it was said that the first phase would be concluded in November 2021¹³.

A further fact concerns the pace at which the UGPK is being made operational. It seems to be going at a snail’s pace. Since the UGPK was created in November 2015, more than 7 years have passed, but on its internet site¹⁴ there is no report of its activities which could give some indication about what improvements its creation has brought to the sector. These facts raise problems of transparency in the operation of this institution.

If the UGPK does not publish reports which should be public about its performance, there is a risk that acts of corruption and malpractices may occur, worsened by the fact that this is an election year, when there is greater appetite for the maximization of gains due to uncertainties about the next government cycles.

4. Risk of an increase in cases of corruption to finance the election campaign

In 2022 Frelimo held its 12th Congress. At this Congress, Amélia Muendane, the Chairperson of the Mozambique Tax Authority (AT), was elected to the Frelimo Political Commission. This was seen as a conflict of interests, although legally and directly there is nothing to prevent her being elected to this position.

The election of the TA chairperson to a political party body should be seen from the viewpoint that she is at the head of the body responsible for collecting taxes, and thus her party appointment is ethically objectionable. According to the newspaper *A Carta* “she was already noteworthy for her trend to ignore the line ministers and deal directly with President Filipe Nyusi, which was supposedly crucial in managing the first presidential election of the current president¹⁵”.

This situation shows the need to separate the exercise of public duties from those of a party political nature, and particularly when these duties are in the hands of the same person. In the specific case of Amélia Muendane, this raises suspicions that she could act against the public treasury and draw dividends in favour of the political party she represents, particularly when the simultaneous exercise of public and private duties occurs in an election year.

In this case, the possibility of Muendane facilitating the looting of public money for electoral purposes is a worrying possibility, with the potential that it could happen. Hence, situations such as that of Amélia Muendane should merit their own regulation in order to avoid or dissipate doubts about their conduct.

In the case of Constantino Bacela, the newspaper “*A Verdade*” describes him as a “businessman of the regime”. In recent years he has won many of the tenders to supply goods and services to the State¹⁶. That is, Constantino Bacela may be used as a spearhead to finance the ruling party through public tenders awarded directly to the companies he represents.

The paper *A Carta* says “the fact that Bacela now has the position of Minister in the President’s Office alongside his continued involvement in business (...) raises enormous questions of probity (...). His Central Committee membership card is a safe conduct in his journeys through the UGEAS of this country”¹⁷. That is, through Bacela, public money could be removed via public tenders faked for this purpose, and thus financing the election campaign of the ruling party.

The two figures described above serve to illustrate what we knew in the past from the confessions of Maria Helena Taipo, the former minister of labour and social security, and of Diodino Cambaza, the former Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the public company *Aerportos de Moçambique*. They both told courts that they had diverted public money to finance the ruling party.

A study held by CIP and the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in 2016, and adopted by the Mozambican government, ascertained that the price of corruption in Mozambique, in the 2005-2015 period, was about 4.9 billion US dollars, the equivalent of about 30% of the 2014 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 60% of the 2015 State Budget. The study concluded that the weight of corruption is damaging for the State Budget, for the economy, for business, and for development and socio-economic well-being (CIP, 2016)¹⁸.

In addition to enriching illicitly the political and business elite that controls the State, the money from corruption is used to finance the election campaign of the Frelimo Party and of its candidates. This is occurring in a context in which the State finances the election campaigns of the competing political formations, either through the transfer of funds from the State Budget to the parties, coalitions of parties or groups of proposing citizens (so-called direct public financing); or through the payment of “broadcasting time” for the political formations in the publicly-owned media for purposes of propaganda, and tax exemptions on the import of campaign materials (so-called indirect public financing).

Public financing for the election campaigns of the competing political formations is based on two arguments. The first, linked to the fight against corruption, rests on the idea that, by financing the campaign of the political formations, the State would be making them

financially autonomous, thus preventing them from being captured by the economic interests which finance them. The second argument rests on the idea that public financing would reduce the disproportionate influence of economic interests on electoral competition, thus creating more equal conditions for parties in the electoral dispute¹⁹.

Even so, cases of the diversion of public funds to finance election campaigns of the Frelimo Party have been recurrent. For example, the current President of the Republic, Filipe Nyusi, was cited as having received, in the context of the hidden debts, a bribe of a million dollars in May 2014 to finance his bid for the Presidency. This revelation was made by Jean Boustani, a senior manager of Prinvest, during his trial in November 2019 in the United States²⁰.

In a document which Iskandar Safa, the owner of Prinvest, submitted to the High Court in London, where the Mozambican State began a legal case in an attempt to annul the payment of the hidden debts, he states that, at the request of Armando Guebuza, the then President of the Republic, Prinvest disbursed about 10 million US dollars to cover the costs of the campaign of the Frelimo Party and its presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi²¹.

Also in 2014, part of the money diverted from the National Social Security Institute (INSS) was used to finance the election campaign of the Frelimo Party. The revelation was made by the former Labour Minister herself, Maria Helena Taipo, when she was under investigation for corruption, for facilitating contracts between private companies and the INSS, an institution that she was responsible for overseeing²². In her defence, the former Labour Minister said that, in her capacity as head of the Frelimo Central Brigade assisting Nampula province, she had the obligation to mobilise funds to support the election campaign of the Frelimo Party and of its presidential candidate, Filipe Nyusi.

In the trial of the case of corruption in the public company Aeroportos de Moçambique (ADM), it was also revealed that part of the 54 million US dollars diverted by the then Chairperson of the Board of Directors (PCA), Diodino Cambaza, was used to finance activities of the Frelimo Party. Indeed, Arlindo Chilundo, at the time the director of the Frelimo Party Central School, confirmed the reception of equipment valued at seven million meticaís, donated by the then PCA of ADM²³.

The cases reported here show that the risk of the diversion of State funds to finance the election campaign and the private interests of State leaders is very high. For this reason, CIP urges the relevant public bodies, namely:

The **Public Prosecutor's Office and the Administrative Tribunal** to investigate all those suspected of diverting funds during election periods and to strengthen the application of the policies to fight against corruption.

The **Assembly of the Republic** should pass a law to regulate the financing of political parties, clarifying which bodies may make donations and limiting the amounts that can be donated. It should also pass a specific law that forbids the managers of public institutions responsible for collecting and managing state revenue from forming part of political party bodies, since they are likely to fall into situations of incompatibility, conflict of interests and violation of ethical principles;

The **Political Parties** should be obliged to publish all the donations they receive, otherwise they will be held legally responsible;

The **civil society organisations and the media** should continue to monitor and divulge cases of corruption for electoral financing, as well as actions of advocacy for the transparency of electoral financing.

5. Public Procurement: risks of manipulation of public contracting for illicit political financing

Public procurement plays an important role in the management of public finances. At least 33% of the country's public expenditure, equivalent to 10% of the GDP, is intended to acquire goods and services and to hire public works contractors²⁴. Hence, procurement is among the areas highly exposed to risks of corruption²⁵.

The context of elections, such as those that are approaching, worsens the risks of corruption in public procurement. The experience of previous elections shows that, to make their election propaganda viable, parties resort to illicit forms of financing, including corruption²⁶. In general, political and administrative actors, appointed because of political confidence, use their “position in the administrative structure” to extract public resources to finance political party activities²⁷.

One of the ways through which public resources are diverted to political financing is the manipulation of public contracting, whether this is by favouring companies associated with the party, or by over-invoicing the value of the bid in order to receive commissions later²⁸.

Over-invoicing in public contracting is one of the sophisticated ways in which public resources are diverted to finance election campaigns. Examples are the recent cases of the INSS and of the Hidden Debts.

These examples show not only that money from corruption in public contracting is used to finance election campaigns, but also that the phenomenon is a trend in Mozambique. For this reason, in the context of elections, such as those that are approaching, public procurement merits special attention, taking into account the eminent risks of corruption.

5.1 Risk of corruption in municipal Procurement

The risks of corruption in public contracting to finance election campaigns extend to the municipalities. The large number of cases of corruption in public contracting involving municipal authorities on the eve of municipal elections draws our attention²⁹. For example, in 2018, the year in which the last municipal elections were held, seven mayors were accused of corruption.

The cases range from over-invoicing to bribes in public contracting³⁰. Recently municipal authorities in Nampula were tried for suspected acts of corruption – including violation of the public procurement rules – committed on the eve of the 2018 municipal elections. In October 2022, a few months from the municipal elections, managers of the Pemba municipality were placed under investigation for suspicions of corruption in the hiring of public works contractors³¹.

In the context of municipal elections in which the State does not allocate public funds to the parties and candidates to finance their election campaigns, as happens in the general elections, the risks of the municipal authorities resorting to corruption to finance political party activities are relatively high. The examples cited above are the unequivocal proof of this trend.

In the 2023 elections, the risks of corruption in municipal procurement may be relatively high. The increase in the number of municipalities to 65 will not only sharpen the competition between the parties but it may also put pressure on the accounts of the parties and at the same time exacerbate the risks of corruption in municipal procurement to finance their election propaganda activities.

Generally, the cases of corruption in public procurement in the municipalities have received little attention from the media and from civil society – whether because of the volume of money involved or the political relevance of the actors implicated. However, both at central and local government levels, corruption in public contracting damages the public finances and the provision of public services to citizens.

6. Insurgency: risk of increased attacks in Cabo Delgado in an electoral context

The holding of local (municipal) elections may act as extra motivation for the insurgents who have been operating for six years in Cabo Delgado, to step up their attacks in the province aimed at political targets. In Cabo Delgado there will be elections in five municipalities, namely, Pemba, Chiúre, Montepuez, Mueda and Mocímboa da Praia. The places at greatest risk of suffering more terrorist attacks in the electoral context are Mocímboa da Praia, Mueda and, to a rather lesser degree, Montepuez and Chiúre.

The insurgents are opposed to the secular State and advocate the establishment of a government based on the *sharia* – Islamic law³². The holding of elections to designate local leaders could serve as an extra motivation for the insurgents to undertake localized attacks in Cabo Delgado against political targets.

In the 2018/19 election cycle, the insurgents undertook several attacks against voter registration posts and against villages and towns that were visited by politicians, mostly from the ruling party, for the election campaign. In some cases, the attacks forced the closure of voter registration brigades, and other posts were deliberately vandalised³³.

In this year's elections, there is a risk of more attacks against political targets, which would have a double impact, that of expanding the propaganda of the Islamic State to an international audience attentive to following the elections, and also of discouraging people from participating in the elections for reasons of security.

To prevent this risk from occurring, the State should step up security, from intelligence to collect information that makes it possible to forecast and prevent attacks, to increasing the readiness of the Defence Forces to respond and repel in due time eventual attacks.

7. Risk of the occurrence of electoral crimes and violence

Elections in Mozambique have been marked by the occurrence of violence before, during and after the elections. Electoral violence should be understood in the perspective of Laakso (2007) as an activity motivated by the attempt to affect the results of the elections – by manipulating the procedures and electoral participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It is expressed through intimidation of the voters and the candidates, assassinations, attacks against their properties, forced displacement, illegal detentions, and riots³⁴.

In the pre-election phase, the main violations occur during the voter registration, when the ruling party seeks to strengthen control over the electoral administration bodies in order to introduce ghost voters, fundamental for manipulating the election results during the voting period. The voter registration in Gaza, in 2019, was an example of this. More than 300,000 ghost voters were registered. The districts of Chókwè, Chibuto, Limpopo and Chongoene saw their number of voters grow by 160%, 110% and 100%, from 2014 to 2019³⁵.

The manipulation of the numbers of voters and the pressure from Civil Society Organisations for greater monitoring of the elections were among the reasons for the murder of Anastácio Matavele, in October 2019, in Xai-Xai. Anastácio Matavele was assassinated a week before the elections, when he was training election observers.

To limit greater access of independent observers, the electoral administration bodies held up their accreditation. The observers from many civil society organisations in Gaza, for example, were excluded from the elections because they were denied credentials.

In the Gaza provincial branch of STAE, frequent breakdowns of the machines were alleged which forced several organisations to remain there for days. But every day election observers were accredited who came from organisations linked to the Frelimo Party, such as the National Organisation of Teachers (ONP), the Association of Natives and Friends of Chibuto – AMUC (set up by Edson Macuácuá and Eliseu Machava), Muchefa (set up by the Mayor of Manjacaze), the Gaza Association of Road Transport Operators (ASTROGAZA), the OJM, and the CPJ among others. At no time was their accreditation interrupted for supposed breakdowns, nor were the machines collected and taken away for repairs. As the deadline for accreditation approached, so the computers had more problems.

In all, 820 national and international civil society observers were not accredited. So, not even half the independent observers were accredited.

The preliminary report from the Election Observation Mission of the European Union states that unknown groups of observers obtained accreditation in the days immediately prior to the elections, throughout the country. Their number grew rapidly from 10,000 to 42,000, without their affiliation being known³⁶.

Election violence begins in the voter registration phase, with the manipulation of the number of voters. There is no evidence that any work has been done to prevent the same situation from being repeated in this year's municipal elections. On the contrary, municipal governance, particularly in the municipalities under Frelimo management, has been highly contested. Maputo and Matola cities are examples of this, which could point towards greater political competition, and consequently, an increase in election violence.

Physical violence has been a distinctive mark of national elections during the election campaign. The imbalances between the opposition and the ruling party have been evident in this phase – in part because Frelimo benefits from control of the state apparatus for its campaigns, particularly the use of public goods such as vehicles and the use of public officials. In the regions where there is a balance of forces, such as in the municipalities in the centre and north of the country, the level of confrontation during the campaign may be reduced. The parties are aware that a confrontation in a context of a balance of forces could result in serious damage, and so they advise against this kind of shock. But in the municipalities where there is a weak balance of forces, there could be a high trend to chase and provoke less representative groups, and there are high levels of uncertainty about the consequences of possible physical clashes.

During the voting phase, the main actors are the police, the Frelimo delegates and the observers accredited by organisations belonging to Frelimo members. It can be expected that the scenario of violence in the voting period will prevail, and perhaps at a high level given the unpopularity of the rulers of various Frelimo-held municipalities. That is, where there is greater uncertainty about the winner of the elections, an increase in election violence will be more likely.

But it will also depend on the quality of the candidates whom the opposition will present in these municipalities. It will depend above all on the regions and on the municipalities. For example, the municipalities of Gaza are, by nature, those which record the greatest levels of violence of anywhere in the country, caused by Frelimo shock groups against the opposition – and also of the violence (threats, detentions and manipulation of results) where the actors are the police and the Frelimo shock groups (members of the OJM). In the centre and north, where the political competition is high, there are lower levels of confrontation between party sympathisers, but there are more frequent threats and police detentions of members of the opposition³⁷.

In the 2019 general elections, post-election violence was minimum or non-existent. The death of the leader of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, may have reduced the levels of post-election conflict. The rhetoric of war and of the use of force to reverse the election results almost did not exist. However, this does not mean that Renamo, today more divided, cannot resume the aggressive stance of the days of Afonso Dhlakama. There are sufficient conditions for this and there are members of this party who favour the model of pressure of its previous leader. They oppose the pacifism of Ossufo Momade whom they accuse of subordination to Frelimo.

The reduction in levels of violence in all phases of the elections depends on greater control and monitoring of all these phases by the civil society organisations. Most of the organisations are concerned more with the election campaign and above all with the voting, than with the phase of voter registration, which is crucial in determining the number of seats, and in manipulating the election results. Greater control and monitoring could greatly reduce manipulation of the voter registration numbers and hence reduce the conflicts that result from the attempt to manipulate the results to justify the ghost voter data.

In general, there are signs that the levels of election violence could be high, but it will depend on the quality of the candidates whom the opposition will present. There is a relative weariness towards Frelimo governance in the municipalities, except in Chimoio and some others where the results are relatively positive.

8. Risk of repeating unmet electoral promises

In an election year, it is to be expected that candidates for political office make promises with the purpose of earning the sympathy of the voters. It is up to the voters to monitor compliance with the promises made during the election campaign.

In the 2023 elections, there is a risk that candidates for mayors of municipalities will make the same promises as five years ago, and which were not kept! This section presents some promises made by the mayoral candidates in Maputo (Eneas Comiche, of Frelimo), Matola (Calisto Cossa, of Frelimo), Nampula (Paulo Vahanle, of Renamo) and Quelimane (Manuel de Araújo, of Renamo) which have so far not been kept. With less than a year to the end of their terms of office, there is a risk that the same promises will be made again.

8.1 Maputo City Municipality

The election manifesto of Eneas Comiche, mayor of Maputo City, rested on four pillars, namely Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption, the Consolidation of National Unity, Social and Human Development, and the Development of Infrastructures³⁸

In the pillar of Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption, Comiche promised to implement the project “Maputo transparent and free from corruption”, which sought to improve the provision of public services, strengthen the integrity of the municipal administration, as well as to simplify and computerize administrative processes and procedures. The final objective was “to reduce the waiting time in response to petitions from municipal citizens, to prevent acts of corruption and to make an example of offenders”. The project also sought to ensure deeper participation of municipal citizens in taking decisions about local development in the municipal districts and neighbourhoods.

More than 4 years later there has been no advance in implementing the Project. By way of example, municipal citizens continue to wait for an eternity for a reply to a request for a Land Use Title (DUAT) for housing. Meanwhile, municipal staff are having fun selling land or facilitating licences. No case is known of any members of the municipal staff being held responsible for acts of corruption during the term of office of Eneas Comiche. Cases such as the usurpation of the former space of the Fish Market from the sellers to be allocated to people from the political elite show that the municipality is ever more distant from ordinary citizens³⁹.

As for the Consolidation of National Unity, the mayor of Maputo promised to promote the economic and social inclusion of municipal citizens in the life of their neighbourhood and of the municipality; during the campaign, he promised to develop the project “Safe Maputo”, to strengthen the ties between the police and the community, so as to guarantee safety, tranquility, and the well-being of the municipal citizens, and to promote the formation of groups of volunteer fire-fighters in the neighbourhoods, as a first responder intervention force.

This is another promise that so far the municipality has not honoured. To date there is no record of the formation of any groups of volunteer fire-fighters, while in the city neighbourhoods crime is increasing and community policing has not been activated. Instead of protecting citizens, the Municipal Police is a threat to citizens, with growing acts of violence and corruption aimed against people selling on the streets and minibus-taxi drivers⁴⁰.

In the pillar of Social and Human Development, no improvement has been recorded in the quality of education, there has been no rehabilitation and expansion of the health centres, and so far there has been no improvement in the attendance in the public health services. This reality contradicts the promises made during the campaign and which are clear in the Frelimo Party election manifesto for Maputo city. According to the manifesto, the municipality was ready to promote improvements in the quality of education, to rehabilitate and expand health centres, and to improve attendance in the public health services.

The pillar with the largest number of promises not kept by the mayor of Maputo, is that on the development of infrastructures, which sought the construction and rehabilitation of the network of dirt and paved roads, including their respective drainage and sanitation systems. The Maputo city roads are calling out for complete rehabilitation, and the municipality simply fills in the existing potholes⁴¹. Comiche promised to build pavements and cycle paths in the municipal districts of KaMpfumu, KaNhlamankulu, KaMaxaqueni, KaMavota, KaMubukwana, KaTembe and KaNyaka. In the final year of Eneas Comiche’s term of office, there is no sign of any cycle path in Maputo City.

8.2 Matola City Municipality

In this municipality, one of the main problems is the defective collection of solid waste.⁴² The municipality itself recognises its lack of capacity to provide this basic service, and blames the municipal citizens for causing filth in the city⁴³.

However, during the campaign for the fifth municipal elections, under the slogan “For the Matola that we want”, Calisto Cossa promised to improve the garbage collection system, to improve the road network, and to guarantee a storm water drainage system in the areas frequently hit by flooding. Four years later, the municipal citizens are continuing to live with the same problems, although solutions were promised a long time ago. Neighbourhoods are constantly flooded, and it is Nkobe and Liberdade that suffer most⁴⁴.

8.3 Quelimane City Municipality

The Mayor of Quelimane, Manuel de Araújo, made many electoral promises which are yet to be honoured.

Among the range of promises he made were the provision of more jobs, more clean drinking water, more electricity, more paved roads, more vertical, horizontal and luminous street signs, better management of solid waste, better and sustainable management of liquid waste which will result in fewer diseases, less malaria (the disease that kills most in Quelimane), and less diarrhoea⁴⁵. The promise where the non-compliance by Manuel de Araújo most angers the municipal citizens concerns the failure to pave the roads⁴⁶.

The inefficiency of the waste collection and management system is another problem that deprives Quelimane citizens of their sleep⁴⁷. The situation is so dramatic that it causes the proliferation of diseases, such as diarrhoea, that are related with poor sanitation⁴⁸. And there are streets which are impassable because of the heaps of garbage piled up on them. This situation once again shows lack of compliance with a promise made during the election campaign.

8.4 Nampula City Municipality

In the election manifesto which led to the election of Paulo Vahanle as mayor of the Nampula municipality, in 2018, Vahanle announced that he would comply with a range of promises, notably the building of an Arts and Crafts School to promote self-employment with the goal of teaching young municipal citizens of Nampula to build and make the things their communities need: the construction of a municipal fish market, and finally building a municipal cemetery and landfill outside the residential areas⁴⁹.

None of these promises were kept. The Arts and Crafts School remains on paper. The Fish Market has not yet been built: the existing market was simply rehabilitated. The municipal landfill is still no more than a project⁵⁰.

9. Risk of increased repression of fundamental freedoms and closure of civic space

In Mozambique, political power exerts control over the media, both the state-owned media and the private media. Several forms are used to control and condition the work of the media in Mozambique. The main ones are the appointment and political control over the managers of the media owned by state bodies, while in the private media control is exercised through cutting advertising if they report news contrary to the will of the Government⁵¹.

In election periods, the will of political power to influence public opinion grows and it does this through control of the media. This is visible in the coverage of elections in Mozambique by the media, both public and private. The ruling Frelimo Party and its candidates are given more broadcasting time, and the media tend to publish more positive news items about them, in comparison with news about the opposition⁵².

This year, the context of an unpopular government due to problems such as the incongruencies of the Single Wage Table (TSU), the increase in kidnappings, the incapacity of the government to provide aid to the people displaced by the war in Cabo Delgado, will require from the government and the ruling party more efforts to control public opinion.

Hence, there is a greater risk of control over the most important media, both public and private. This control will be exerted in the traditional forms of editorial control over the public media, through the appointment of politically aligned managers, but also through the enticement of the privately owned media via the advertising placed by government agencies.

9.1 Closure of civic space

Civil society organisations have played an important role as pressure groups monitoring governance. In a context of media weakened by government control, civil society organisations have played an important advocacy role.

Specifically in election cycles various civic initiatives are born, for observation, monitoring the integrity of the elections, critical analysis of election manifestos, and prevention of election violence. These initiatives suffer a variety of forms of political repression, including blocking the accreditation of independent observers⁵³ and in extreme cases even the assassination of election observers by police agents⁵⁴.

The national and international organisations that defend press freedom and civic and political rights, and development partners, should pay special attention to similar situations occurring again in the present election cycle, given the context described above of the unpopularity of the Government.

It is important to strengthen mechanisms to denounce violations of freedoms by the Government and its agents and to create conditions to bring these cases to national or international justice, which may require the constitution of legal defenders of freedoms to act in useful time.

The Public Prosecutor's Office, which has been apathetic in acting in cases in defence of diffuse interests, needs to show more skill and act more pro-actively to hold responsible those politicians who violate the fundamental freedoms of citizens.

10. Gender balance: Risk of excluding women from political participation

Gender equality is at the centre of Mozambican economic and social public policies⁵⁵. Since the first multi-party general elections of 1994, the political parties have guaranteed the presence of women in their parliamentary groups. The number of women in parliament has oscillated between 42.6% and 47.9%.

In the 2014 elections, the Frelimo Party, although it emerged the winner, lost some seats in the Assembly of the Republic, falling from 191 to 144 deputies. This factor influenced the number of women the party elected, which fell from 81, in 2009, to 69, in 2014, although the percentage of women on the Frelimo lists increased from 42.4% to 47.9%.

Renamo has also significantly increased the presence of women in parliament since the first parliamentary elections of 1994, when there were only 13 women in the Renamo parliamentary group (11.6%). More recently the figure has risen to 24 (26.9%). There was a significant slowdown in the 2009 elections, in comparison with the 2004 elections, when the number of women in the Renamo group fell from 23 to 15. However, this fall was due to the drastic decline in the number of deputies whom Renamo elected (which dropped from 90 to 51). The percentage of women for the same party rose from 25.5%, in 2004, to 29.4%, in 2009, the highest so far achieved by this party.

The Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) took part in the parliamentary elections. In the 2009 elections, it elected one woman, and two in 2014. This party currently has the smallest percentage of women in parliament (21.5%). It is also the parliamentary group with the smallest number of seats in the Assembly of the Republic.

The lists of candidates supplied to the CNE by the political parties for the 2009 and 2014 elections allow us to analyse the percentage of women proposed by each party for parliament. Of the three parties with seats in parliament, Frelimo has the largest percentage of women in its lists, and the MDM is the only party where the percentage of women fell between the 2009 and 2014 elections. One very interesting aspect is the massive presence of women on the lists in positions where they cannot be elected. This may demonstrate a lesser involvement of women in political activities that guarantee them greater visibility and election.

Currently none of the 11 cities that are provincial capitals has a woman mayor. In this year's municipal elections, it is necessary to monitor the risk of increasingly limiting the participation of women, as candidates for mayor in the larger municipalities. The situation whereby women are left to the last places must be reversed.

Gender mainstreaming is a cross-cutting area that affects everybody. Hence, it is the responsibility of everyone, including civil society organisations, the community, the political parties, the government, and religious congregations, among others, to monitor its design and implementation. Since this is a powerful tool for creating a more equitable society, the time has come to take a position and fight for an inclusive world, where everyone has the same rights and opportunities.

Conclusion

The holding of elections should be an opportunity to consolidate democracy, by allowing the political participation of citizens in choosing their leaders. However, as shown in the text, in a context of endemic corruption and authoritarian governance, the elections run a series of risks.

In the text, it was shown that various economic, political, and even security risks may result from the holding of elections. The elections may be used as an opportunity to divert State funds, in various ways, and they could also lead to an increase in the repression of fundamental freedoms, and even to assassinations of political activists, and to the manipulation of democratic institutions in order to win elections fraudulently.

The context of armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado may also lead to an increase in attacks against political and civilian targets, during the phases of voter registration, the election campaign and even the voting.

The political parties, which are still dominated by men, may limit still further the participation of women in elections, limiting the candidacy of women to head Group A municipalities, which are the provincial capitals.

So that these risks do not occur, it is necessary that all of society works actively in monitoring them, denounces repression of fundamental rights, violations of the law, and advocates for a more honest and democratic society.

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