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Evaluation of community benefits and budget transparency in the Zambézia Integrated Landscape Management Programme (ZILMP)



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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANAC	National Administration for the Conservation Areas
BAU	Balcão de Atendimento Único [One-Stop Service Centre]
BR	Boletim da República [Mozambique Government Official Gazette]
BSP	Mozambique Benefit Sharing Plan
CESC	Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building Centre
CGRN [NRMCS]	Natural Resources Management Committee
CIP	Public Integrity Centre
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
CTA	Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique
EnABLE	Enhancing Access to Benefits while Lowering Emissions
ER	Emission Reductions
ERPA	Emission Reductions Payment Agreement
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FNDS	National Fund for Sustainable Development
NUIT	Tax Identification Number
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MTR [RTGS]	Real-Time Gross Settlement System
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System
OCBs [CBOs]	Community-based Organisations
ONGs [NGOs]	Non-Governmental Organisations
PDIZ	Zambézia Integrated Development Platform
PIU	Programme Implementation Unit
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SDAE	District Service for Economic Activities
SISTAFE	State Financial Administration System
SDPI	District Planning and Infrastructure Service
ZIMLP	Zambézia Integrated Landscape Management Programme

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Executive Summary

The Zambézia Integrated Landscape Management Programme (ZILMP), which is being implemented by the National Fund for Sustainable Development (FNDS) and financed by the World Bank under the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), is one of Mozambique's key initiatives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest fires.

Implemented across nine districts in Zambézia province, the ZILMP's goal was to reduce around 10 million tonnes of CO₂ over the reference period from 2018 to 2024, using an approach that seeks to combine climate benefits with socio-economic incentives for local communities.

Although it had the potential to reduce emissions and improve living conditions for local communities, the ZILMP did not perform well. The project achieved only 17.7% of its emission reduction targets, out of a total of USD 50 million¹ that was expected to be raised by mid-2024, bringing only minimal benefits (80% of the total funds from the first round of funding) to local communities, despite the country's potential.

This is why the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) conducted a study to assess community benefits and budget transparency in the ZILMP from 2019 to 2025.

The study employed a qualitative approach and was conducted from May 2025 to February 2026. Fieldwork occurred from August to September 2025 in the districts of Maganja da Costa, Pebane, Gilé, Ile, Mulevala and Mocuba. In these districts, 85 out of a total of 90 Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) were visited. It involved document analysis, literature review, direct field observation, and the conducting of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with key programme stakeholders, namely: i) a Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) specialist; ii) the environmental and social manager of the National Fund for Sustainable Development (FNDS); iii) programme focal points from the District Secretariat for Planning and Infrastructure (SDPI) and the District Secretariats for Economic Activities (SDAE) in the districts of Ile, Mulevala and Pebane; IV) business manager at the Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique (CTA) in Zambézia; V) President of the Integrated Development Platform of Zambézia (PDIZ); VI) chairs and vice-chairs of the OCBs in the districts of Pebane, Gilé, Mulevala and Mocuba; and VII) 415 members of the OCBs in the programme's host communities, representing 15.6% of the 2,659 programme beneficiaries across all districts covered by the programme.

The limitation of the study has been the lack of cooperation on the part of the FNDS in sharing information about the companies funded by the programme. This situation restricted access to relevant data and made it difficult to conduct interviews with the owners of these companies. In order to overcome these limitations, we analysed reports from the SDPI and SDAE and interviewed the CTA representative in Zambézia province.

ZILMP has produced both positive and negative impacts throughout its implementation. Some of the positive aspects include a greater awareness of environmental conservation, an understanding of the impact of deforestation and forest degradation, increased knowledge of social and environmental safeguard measures, the diversification of income sources, improved food security, the construction of public infrastructure to support communities, and the country's contribution to the reduction of CO₂ emissions.

¹ Due to the unsatisfactory results achieved by the program, in September 2024 the World Bank revised the total value and the reductions to be achieved. The program went from a total of USD 50 million, equivalent to 10 million tons of CO₂, to a total of USD 8.8 million, equivalent to 1.7 million tons of CO₂ reduced.

Despite the positive socio-economic and environmental impacts, the low performance of ZILMP may be the result of a combination of several factors identified in the study, notably: insufficient participation by host communities; inadequate criteria for the selection of beneficiaries; potential conflicts of interest during the selection process; social conflicts regarding access to climate finance; and a loss of trust in the programme's managers; low female representation in leadership; lack of transparency in the budget; irregularities in the use of funds intended for forest protection; disbursement of funds to CBOs through unplanned channels; financial discrepancies; and preferential treatment to public institutions over local communities. Considering the results, it is recommended that:

1. To the Government – To implement an integrated model of programme governance that ensures the province-wide decentralisation of resources, administration and fiscal powers, together with clear accountability mechanisms;
2. To the FNDS (Programme Implementation Unit) – To guarantee informed participation through capacity-building sessions with stakeholders, particularly host communities, about the scope of the programme
3. To the SDAE and SDPI of the districts of Mulevala, Ile and Maganja da Costa – To reinforce mechanisms for institutional integrity through the provision of training in ethics and functional supervision for public officials involved in the programme;
4. To the Zambézia Integrated Development Platform – to take on a more proactive role in the regular monitoring and oversight of field activities developed by CBOs and to mobilise alternative funds for this purpose.

1. INTRODUCTION

Deforestation in Mozambique is one of the country's main environmental challenges, resulting from a combination of factors, such as the expansion of extensive agriculture, charcoal production, illegal logging, population growth and rural poverty. Deforestation is estimated to account for around 43%² of the country's CO₂ emissions, a fact that makes it a key priority of the country's climate agenda³.

As a response to this situation, the Government of Mozambique adopted the National REDD+ Strategy, with the aim of aligning international mitigation commitments with finance mechanisms based on results. It is in this context that the Zambézia Integrated Landscape Management Programme (ZILMP) has emerged. Approved in 2018, with funding by the World Bank Group⁴ through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the programme is operationalised under an Emissions Reduction Payment Agreement (ERPA), signed in 2019⁵.

The province of Zambézia is one of the most affected in terms of deforestation, with around 258,000 hectares lost between 2000 and 2014, which corresponds to an annual rate of 0.62%, which is higher than the national average of 0.58%⁶. As a result, the province has been selected as a priority area for action. ZILMP established as its goal the reduction of 10 million tonnes of CO₂, between 2018 and 2024⁷, in nine districts (Alto Molocué, Gilé, Gurué, Ile, Maganja da Costa, Mocuba, Mocubela, Mulevala and Pebane), with the expectation of mobilising up to 50 million US dollars, at a price of 5 USD/tCO₂, on a pay-for-performance basis.

The price of carbon traded under the ERPA is well below the prices on the voluntary carbon market – 15-20 USD/tCO₂ charged on the voluntary carbon market (Verra, Gold Standard) and 30-50 USD/tCO₂ on the European compliance market (ETS) between 2019 and 2024. This difference represents a cost opportunity for Mozambique and an opportunity for the country to explore new alternative sources in voluntary carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement⁸, thereby guaranteeing competitive prices and acceptable contractual terms to leverage and institutionalise the carbon market at national level.

² Mozambique is among the top 10 countries with the highest rates of deforestation worldwide, ranking ninth in the global rankings. See: FAO (2020). Global Forest Resources Assessment: Main report. Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9825en>.

Government of Mozambique. (2015, 5 October)

https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/system/files/documents/Mozambique_ZILMP_Executive%20Summary.pdf

³Grupo Banco Mundial. (S/D). Gestão da Paisagem da Zambézia: Fortalecendo os Meios de Subsistência e Conservação das Florestas em Moçambique. //

[Accessed on 26 February, 2026, at14.33].

⁴ The World Bank Group is composed of several institutions. For the carbon funds, the financing came from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

⁵ Emission Reductions Payment Agreement (2019). Zambézia Emission Reductions Program. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility FCPF Carbon Fund ERPA Tranche A Mozambique SIGNED (1).pdf

⁶ Government of Mozambique. (2015, 5 October)

https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/system/files/documents/Mozambique_ZILMP_Executive%20Summary.pdf [Accessed on 26 February, 2026, at14.33].

⁷ Grupo Do Banco Mundial. (S/D). Op. Cit

⁸ Article 6 of the Paris Agreement sets out the mechanisms for international cooperation to support countries in mitigating climate change, allowing for greater flexibility and efficiency in meeting climate targets.

Despite the potential of ZILMP to reduce CO₂ emissions and generate socio-economic benefits for local communities, the environmental and financial outcomes of the programme raise questions about the effectiveness of its mechanisms for governance and benefit-sharing. Centralised management, weak local institutional capacity, lack of transparency in the criteria for accessing climate funds, and the risks of misuse of resources by the local administration represent challenges that have undermined the effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of the programme⁹.

In this context, questions arise as to the extent to which results-based mechanisms for climate finance, such as REDD+, are being implemented in a transparent and inclusive manner, and are aligned with local institutional realities. It is also important to understand whether the observed shortcomings reflect limitations in the governance model adopted. Taking this into account, this study aims to assess budget transparency, community participation and beneficiary eligibility criteria under the ZILMP between 2019 and 2025.

The results point to a gap between the targets set and the actual performance of the programme. By the end of the reference period (2024), only 1.7 million tCO₂ of certified reductions had been generated between 2018 and 2020 (Table 1) against a total target of 10 million tCO₂, equivalent to USD 8.8 million, which is approximately 17.7% of the programme’s overall target. This financial volume is far lower than the projected amount.

Table 1: History of emissions reductions and funds generated by the program.

Reporting Period	Reduced emissions– ER (tCO ₂)		Amount (USD)	
	Goal	Achieved	Goal	Achieved
2018	1,500,000	1,286,049	7,500,000	6,400,000
2019-2020	1,500,000	483,758	7,500,000	2,400,000
2021-2022	1,500,000	0	7,500,000	0
2023-2024	5,500,00	0	27,500,000	0
Total	10,000,000	1,769,807	50,000,000	8,800,000

Source: ERPA (2025).

In view of the poor performance, the Government and the World Bank have adjusted the emissions target from 10 million tonnes of CO₂ to 1.7 million tonnes of CO₂, based on the results achieved. This adjustment was associated with an increase of deforestation in relation to the reference level, which reached its peak in 2021, mainly due to the expansion of shifting cultivation¹⁰.

Although around 80% of the funds allocated in the first call for proposals had been disbursed in the districts analysed – equivalent to 52.4 million MT¹¹, there are still substantial amounts, around 14 million MT, to be transferred, with marked variations by district: Pebane (7%), Gilé (12%), Mocuba (6%), Mulevala (54%),

⁹ Anderson, E & Zerrif, H. (2012). The Effects of REDD+ on Forest People in Africa: Access, Distribution and participation in Governance. RFGI Working Paper No. 1. CODESRIA. Southern Voices Capacity Building Program. (2013). REDD+ safeguards: more than good intentions: Case studies from the Accra Caucus

¹⁰ Information obtained through an interview with the MRV specialist of FNDS, conducted on 21 May 2025.

¹¹ The first call for proposals is the initial phase in which the programme invites applications from local communities organised through OCBs in the nine districts covered by the programme to submit their community projects for evaluation. This phase resulted in the approval of 133 applications across the nine districts covered by the programme.

Maganja da Costa (57%) and Ile (36%). There are also considerable delays in disbursements to Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), which include delays in payments for the first and second rounds, even after the programme formally closed in December 2025. It should be noted that 129,343,121.10 MT corresponding to the second round of the programme is still pending disbursement.

The study is structured in five parts, namely: i) the present Introduction, which sets out the context, the problem and the objective of the study; ii) the Methodology, describing the approach used to gather evidence on socio-environmental issues, including the limitations of the study; iii) the Results and Discussion, which describe the collected data and the associated evidence and analyse the information; iv) the Conclusion, summarising the main findings of the study; and v) the Recommendations, which suggest practical actions to be taken to mitigate the problems identified in the study.

2. METHODOLOGY

The study was conducted from May 2025 to March 2026, with fieldwork taking place from August to September 2025 in 85 OCBs¹² in the districts of Pebane, Gilé, Mocuba, Maganja da Costa, Mulevala and Ile. These districts were selected based on their level of forested area¹³ and the volume of disbursements. Pebane, Gilé and Mocuba were the districts with the highest percentage of forested area¹⁴ and received the largest amounts from the programme, whereas Maganja da Costa, Mulevala and Ile had the lowest percentages of forest cover¹⁵ and therefore received smaller amounts.

The study adopted a qualitative approach to the research. It consisted of a documentary analysis and a literature review, based on a consultation of scientific articles and implementation reports published by the FCPF relating to the distribution of benefits and the monitoring of emissions under the ZILMP, legislation governing REDD+ programmes in Mozambique, as well as reports provided by the SDAE and the SDPI concerning the status of fund disbursements under the programme.

Together with the documentary research, a field study was carried out, which consisted of direct observation, recording of audiovisual images, and interviews and semi-structured questionnaires conducted with key stakeholders. Eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors involved in the implementation of the ZILMP, namely: i) an MRV specialist; ii) an Environmental and Social Safeguards manager from the FNDS; iii) three programme focal points (SDPI and SDAE) from the districts of Ile, Mulevala and Pebane; iv) a Business Manager from the CTA in Zambézia; v) the President of PDIZ; and vi) the President and Vice-Presidents of the CBO in the districts of Pebane, Gilé, Mulevala and Mocuba.

The questionnaires were administered to 415 members of the programme's host communities across the six districts studied, of whom 134 were female and 281 were male (Tables 2 e 3).

Table 2: Number of female and male respondents per district.

Districts	Male	Female	Total
Maganja da Costa	48	23	62
Pebane	45	16	61
Gilé	49	13	62
Ile	48	21	69
Mulevala	39	23	62
Mocuba	52	38	90
Total	281	134	415

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on questionnaire data.

¹² In six districts, visits were made to 85 of the 90 OCBs, distributed as follows: Maganja da Costa – 7 out of 7; Pebane – 16 out of 17; Gilé – 23 out of 24; Mulevala – 9 out of 10; Ile – 11 out of 11; and Mocuba – 19 out of 21.

¹³ Districts with greater forest cover would receive more funding for 27 youth, 323 adults and 65 elderly people (Table 2). The age groups used are: 10 to 24 years – youth; 25 to 59 years – adults; and over 60 years – elderly.

¹⁴ FCPF. (2022). ER Monitoring Report: Zambézia Integrated Landshape Management Program (ZILMP). Republic of Mozambique. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Pp. 80-81.

¹⁵ Mercier, C., et al. Preliminary study for the preparation of the Zambézia Integrated Landscape Management Programme (ZILMP). Report for the Government of Mozambique and the FCPF. Etc Terra.

Table 3: Number of respondents from different age groups broken down by gender.

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
Youth (10 to 24)	14	13	27
Adults (25 to 59)	220	103	323
Elderly (>60)	47	18	65
Total	281	134	415

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on questionnaire data

In order to ensure the quality of the data and the validity of the research, certain measures were adopted, such as data triangulation—which involved the use of multiple sources and methods to analyse the phenomenon under study—peer review, cross-checking of information, and attention to the credibility and reliability of the sources. Limitations of the research were identified and discussed, including potential constraints, restrictions on access to information, and other issues that may impact the validity and generalization of the results.

The main limitation of the study was the lack of willingness of the FNDS to provide information about the companies financed by the programme, a fact that restricted access and interviews with the owners of these companies. To mitigate this limitation, we used reports from the District Secretariat for Economic Activities (SDAE) and the District Secretariat for Planning and Infrastructure (SDPI). In addition, an interview was conducted with the representative of the Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique (CTA) in Zambézia.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The ZILMP has produced both positive and negative impacts over the course of its implementation. Some of the positive aspects include elements that present significant opportunities for improving future carbon initiatives in Mozambique.

Awareness about environmental conservation, the effects of deforestation and forest degradation on ecosystems, livelihoods and the climate has increased amongst communities. Furthermore, the programme has promoted increased understanding of environmental and social safeguards, including issues relating to community participation and land-use rights.

Other positive impacts are related to the diversification of income sources. The introduction of alternative activities, such as bees farming, more efficient farming practices and other income-generating initiatives, contributed to a reduction, though only partial, of the communities' dependence on the intensive exploitation of forest resources, which improved food security as a result of increased food availability and diversity. The programme also contributed to the construction of some public infrastructure to support the communities.

By achieving 1.77 million tonnes of CO₂, ZILMP has contributed to the national effort to reduce carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, in line with Mozambique's climate commitments under the Paris Agreement and its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The conservation and restoration of forest areas play a key role in carbon capture, thus contributing to the mitigation of climate change, the strengthening of the ecosystems' resilience and the reduction of communities' vulnerability to extreme weather events, such as floods.

Furthermore, by implementing payment mechanisms based on carbon-related outcomes, ZILMP places Mozambique within the context of international carbon markets and other instruments for climate financing, thus opening up opportunities to mobilise additional resources for forest conservation and sustainable development, provided such mechanisms are accompanied by fair benefit-sharing arrangements, transparency and monitoring.

Despite the positive socio-economic and environmental impacts, the low performance of ZILMPs can be attributed to a combination of several factors identified in the study, namely: a lack of effective participation by host communities; inadequate criteria for beneficiary selection; conflicts of interest in the process of beneficiary selection; social conflicts related to access to climate finance; and a loss of trust in the programme's managers; low representation of women in leadership roles; lack of budget transparency; misappropriation of funds earmarked for forest protection; disbursement of funds to CBOs through channels other than those envisaged; financial discrepancies; and prioritisation of disbursements to public institutions at the expense of local communities.

1.1 Public consultations without the effective participation of host communities

As part of the BSP readiness process, four public consultations were held in Zambézia Province between February and April 2018, with 445 people taking part. The consultations involved various stakeholders: one with the PDIZ, two with representatives from local governments, local communities, the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and one with government representatives from the sectors of land, conservation areas, agriculture, forestry, mineral resources and state administration, as well as representatives from the World Bank. These consultations aimed to discuss the distribution percentages, priority areas and challenges associated with the sharing of BSP benefits¹⁶.

According to the FNDS Environmental and Social Safeguards Manager, the public consultations were also publicised through the programme's focal points, radio stations and community leaders in each district, with the aim of involving as many participants as possible in the process¹⁷.

Findings from the public consultations indicate that 81% of members in the host communities attended the meeting, but without any meaningful involvement. They reported that the meetings were merely a formality and only served to inform them about the programme's funding. They did not play an active role in the decision-making process.

The SDPI focal point for the Ile district¹⁸ and the president of the OCB in Mulevala¹⁹ confirmed that no effective public consultation had taken place and that only funding guidelines had been announced at the local level, together with the FNDS, after a preliminary communication to explain the application process.

Government interference in the formulation of public policy often results in meetings being held to disseminate information or decisions, rather than promoting the meaningful involvement of local groups in decision-making processes²⁰. According to the BSP, the participation of local communities in decision-making processes was ensured through public consultations. By restricting this process to a unilateral announcement, it has violated the right of communities to participate in the programme's decision-making.

Opportunities to participate in REDD+ programmes depend on the political and institutional context of each country. Decentralisation plays a key role in determining the ability of local communities to participate in REDD+ and to access the programme's benefits²¹. In contexts where decentralisation is based on the transfer of powers, community participation in decision-making processes is largely reflected in the design and implementation of the programmes.

¹⁶BSP. (2019). Mozambique ER Program (ZILMP). Maputo: FNDS

¹⁷ Information obtained in an interview with the FNDS Environmental and Social Safeguards Manager, held on 13 October 2025.

¹⁸ Information obtained from an interview with the SDPI focal point for the district of Ile, conducted on 17 October 2025.

¹⁹ Information obtained from an interview with the president of an OCB, conducted on 31 August, 2025.

²⁰ Wong, G., et al. (2017). Narratives in REDD+ benefit sharing: examining evidence within and beyond the forest sector. *Climate Policy*. 19(8), 1038–1051.

²¹ Anderson, E & Zerrif, H. (2012). Op. Cit.

In African countries where centralisation is masked as decentralisation, local elites view decentralisation as a mechanism for expanding the Party/State's hegemony from the local level²². Therefore, it is important to take into account the political and institutional context before implementing climate programmes that involve multi-level governance, in order to prevent local community participation from becoming merely symbolic.

1.2 Lack of transparency in the beneficiary selection process

The process of selecting beneficiaries has been marked by a lack of transparency, particularly as regards the criteria for accessing carbon funds. In the local communities hosting the projects, 59% stated that they were unaware of such criteria. This gap represents more than just a failure of procedure, as it effectively means that the right to information is being limited, and at the same time, restricting the active participation of communities in decision-making processes.

Transparency is essential for promoting good governance and accountability through simplified access to information. The absence of explicit, accessible and verifiable criteria undermines the credibility of the process, giving rise to perceptions of favouritism, arbitrariness and institutional capture. In this sense, transparency at all stages of decision-making should not be understood as an abstract normative principle, but as an indispensable requirement for equity and justice in the distribution of benefits within the REDD+ framework²³.

The eligibility criteria for CBO's, as set out in the Benefit Sharing Plan (BSP) (2019), are:

- I) Being recognised at community level and to have been operating for at least one year;
- II) Have a minimum of 40 members and a clearly defined hierarchical structure
- III) Being legally registered by the date the contract is signed; and
- IV) Being funded by other projects of the same scope as the one for which it is applying.

During fieldwork in the districts of Gilé, Maganja da Costa, Ile and Pebane, it was found that, in practice, criteria II and III had been applied inconsistently and in a selective manner, thus compromising the integrity of the process.

With regard to criterion II, it turned out that several BCOs that had been approved were below the minimum required number of members, ranging from 12 to 20. This situation points not only to verification failures but also to an informal relaxation of criteria, without transparent justification. The districts of Gilé, Ile, Maganja da Costa and Pebane stood out as the most affected by this inconsistency.

²² Otayek, R. (2007). A descentralização como modo de redefinição do poder autoritário? Algumas reflexões a partir de realidades africanas. *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*. pp. 131-150.

²³ Tien, N., Jr.; Thuy, P. (2017). Potential Impact of the REDD+ Program on Poverty Reduction in Nghe An Province, Vietnam. *Forest*.

The Nixiximiho Producers' Association in Mootxe Amwalaku, in the district of Gilé; the Association for the Restoration and Improvement of the Khayane Environment, in the district of Gilé, the Nni None Association in the district of Ile, the GGRN of Mupuela in the district of Maganja da Costa, and the Namanla B Fishermen's Association in the district of Pebane, were among the CBOs approved without meeting the minimum requirement of 40 members, as established by the BSP.

In addition, systematic delays in financial disbursements to the OCBs by the FNDS, together with the context of post-election social instability, contributed to a significant reduction in the number of OCB members in the first round. According to the president of the Plantar e Vida Youth Association, the uncertainty and delays in payments affected community engagement, leading to a loss of interest in the projects developed by the CBOs²⁴.

Delays in the disbursement of funds were not only detrimental to the implementation of activities but also triggered social conflicts within local communities. Several members of the Natural Resource Management Committees (NRMCS) claim to have incurred debts to access climate finance following advice received from programme managers, thereby transferring financial risks to the already vulnerable community stakeholders.

The NRMCS that incurred debt to access climate finance include the NRMCS of Mugaua, Mutabune and Muangane, in the Maganja da Costa district; the Nihame NRMCS and the Wiwanana Orera Producers' Association in Mocoposse, in the Gilé district; the Association for Combating Poverty, the Napacala Farmers' Association, the Natomela NRMCS and the Ehipa Muacaca Cooperative, in the Mulevala district, which has increased internal tensions and undermined trust among community members.

According to the BSP, it was the responsibility of the OCBs to process the necessary documents for their formalisation. However, due to the difficulties encountered by the OCBs throughout the process, the FNDS was forced to hire a service provider to assist solely with the legalisation of the OCBs and to finance the BR of the OCBs²⁵.

In the communities of Nomiua and Muoloa, located in the village of Mupuela (Maganja da Costa), members of the Mutabune and Muangane CGRNs stated that they had raised approximately 27,220.00 MT and 30,000.00 MT, respectively, for the OCB legalisation process, in order to gain access to climate finance. This situation highlights the existence of financial barriers to inclusion in the programme.

With regard to criterion III, the process of CBO legalisation, which was supposed to conform to Decree-Law No. 2/2006 of 3 May²⁶, proved to be excessively bureaucratic, costly and institutionally fragmented. Some of the main constraints include

²⁴ Information obtained from an interview with the president of the Plantar e Vida Youth Association, conducted on 21 August 2025.

²⁵ Information obtained from an interview conducted on 25 September 2025.

²⁶ Decree-Law No. 2/2006 of 3 May: Sets out the terms and procedures for the constitution, recognition and registration of agricultural associations.

- Lack of *Balcões de Atendimento Único* [One-Stop Service Centres] (BAU);
- High administrative costs, which varied from MT 20,000.00 to MT 50,000.00, for handling the documents required to register the CBOs; and
- Unequal technical assistance²⁷ provided to the CBOs by MZCC Agrária. The OCBs in the districts of Maganja da Costa, Ile and Mulevala complained about the lack of technical assistance with the processing of documents.

Beyond the difficulties regarding eligibility criteria, five instances of potential conflicts of interest were identified during selection of beneficiaries in the districts of Mulevala, Maganja da Costa, Gilé and Ile, with direct implications for the credibility of the process, which represented approximately 5.88% of cases across the 85 CBO visited.

In the district of Mulevala, it was found that an SDPI official was simultaneously working on the local project evaluation committee and at a beneficiary CBO. The simultaneous exercise of these two roles raises doubts regarding the impartiality of the decision-making process. Under Article 36(d) of Law No. 16/2012²⁸, this situation may constitute a conflict of interest arising from the unlawful use of one's position as a public servant for personal gain. In accordance with Article 34(1), "a conflict of interest arises when a *public servant is in circumstances where his or her personal interests interfere or may interfere with the fulfilment of his or her duties of impartiality and independence in the pursuit of the public interest*"²⁹.

In the district of Maganja da Costa, a case was identified involving an SDAE employee who also acts as a representative of the Association of Young Volunteers for Development. This situation may also constitute a conflict of interest involving the unlawful use of the status of public servant for personal gain, in accordance with Article 36(d) of Law No. 16/2012³⁰.

Two cases were observed in the district of Gilé, one involving a representative of an association who is an employee of the Administrator's Office and has family ties with a district official. This situation may be considered a conflict of interest due to family and affinity ties, according to Article 36(a) of Law No. 16/2012³¹.

The other case in the district of Gilé involved a member of a CBO who is also a district civil servant, a situation which may also constitute a conflict of interest through the improper use of his position as a civil servant for personal gain, under Article 36(d) of Law No. 16/2012³².

²⁷ Technological assistance provided by MZCC Agraria consisted of helping the OCBs with the process of preparing the necessary documents for the formalisation of the OCBs and securing BR funding for these organisations.

²⁸ Law No. 16/2012 of 14 August. Public Integrity Act., Art. 35.

²⁹ Ibid, Art. 34.

³⁰ Ibid, Art. 36.

³¹ Ibid, Art. 36.

³² Ibid, Art. 36.

In the district of Ile, there was a case involving the president of the Association for Sustainable Rural Development of Mozambique, who is also a supervisor at the SDAE. This situation may also configure a conflict of interest arising from the illegitimate use of his status as a civil servant for personal gain, under the terms of Article 36(d) of Law No. 16/2012³³.

1.3 Low female representation in leadership and access to programme resources


The programme's implementation phase was marked by low gender representation in the leadership of CBO's. The study found that the positions of president and vice-president of CBO's are predominantly held by men. According to the results of the study, 95.6% of men hold the position of president of CBO's and 87.5% hold the position of vice-president. Moreover, the position of secretary is also predominantly held by men, at 83.3% (Figure 1).

Women's participation as leaders of local natural resource committees in REDD+ programmes remains low, varying between 10% and 30%, in contexts where there are no institutionalised inclusiveness policies. In initiatives that include gender considerations, participation increases, varying between 30% and 50%³⁴. However, women's leadership remains a challenge for ZILMP.

³³ Ibid, art. 36.

³⁴ WWF (2014, 14 August). Mujeres líderes participan en proyectos REDD+ para conservar bosques del Pacífico Colombiano. <https://www.wwf.org.co/?390473/Mercados-de-carbono-y-proyectos-REDD> [Accessed on 20 March, 2026, at 16.31], and Rigby (2019, 18 de Julho). Can REDD+ Bring more women into forest conservation. <https://news.mongabay.com/2019/06/can-redd-bring-more-women-into-forest-conservation> [Accessed on 20 March, 2026, at 16.33].

Figure 1: Occupation of programme beneficiaries by gender



Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on data from the questionnaires

The participation and basic understanding of women regarding REDD+ have been limited to attending meetings and training sessions, whilst prominent positions are dominated by men³⁵. This situation undermines the principle of equity advocated by REDD+, since the lack of representation in decision-making structures restricts the ability of these groups to influence the design and implementation of the programme's activities. In addition to gender inequalities in leadership, it was observed that men were more privileged in terms of both monetary³⁶ and non-monetary³⁷ benefits, with 28 men compared to 16 women out of a total of 42 beneficiaries (Table 4).

³⁵ Wong, G., et al. (2017). Narratives in REDD+ benefit sharing: examining evidence within and beyond the forest sector. *Climate Policy*. 19(8), 1038–1051.

³⁶ Monetary benefits are forms of support provided by the programme in the form of cash, including grants, wages and allowances.

³⁷ Non-monetary benefits are forms of support that are not provided in cash; they may take the form of equipment such as beehives, apiculture equipment, irrigation pumps among others.

Table 4: Distribution of monetary and non-monetary benefits by sex

	Total of monetary benefits			Total of non-monetary benefits		
	Number of people	Value received (000 MT)	Value per person (000 MT)	Number of people	Value received (000 MT)	Value per person (000 MT)
Men	15	46,230.00	3,082.00	13	176,364.00	13,566.46
Women	11	12,900.00	1,172.73	3	40,950.00	13,650.00
Total	26	59,130.00	2,274.23	16	217,314.00	13,582.13

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on data from the questionnaires

Women make a significant contribution to forest management, but generally do not benefit from their investments and are excluded from decision-making processes, limiting their ability to participate in and benefit from REDD+ initiatives³⁸.

In terms of the distribution of roles by age group and gender, adults occupy the majority of leadership positions within CBOs (Table 5). The limited participation of youth, elderly people and women restricts the diversity of perspectives and reduces the influence of these stakeholders on the design and implementation of the programme. In a gender-transformative approach, it is necessary to promote the effective and equitable inclusion of different age groups and genders in leadership processes, ensuring not only participation but also decision-making power and the definition of priorities, in order to better address the specific needs and vulnerabilities of communities.

Table 2: Distribution of occupation by age group and gender

Gender		Occupation		
		President	Secretary	Vice-president
Female	Youth	0	1	1
	Adult	2	0	1
	Elderly	0	0	0
	Total	2	1	2
Male	Youth	8	1	3
	Adult	23	3	9
	Elderly	12	1	2
	Total	43	5	14
Female + male				
	Youth	8	2	4
	Adult	25	3	10
	Elderly	12	1	2
	Total	45	6	16

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on data from the questionnaires

In addition, in some districts, the more organised CBO's which were closer to the town were able to submit their proposals more easily and were successful while, in contrast, remote communities faced limitations in accessing information and submitting applications. Studies indicate that beneficiaries located near

³⁸ Habtezion, S. (2016). Gender and Climate Change: Gender and REDD+. UNDP.

conservation programme projects or facilities generally enjoy greater benefits than local communities living in remote areas, giving rise to inequalities between these groups³⁹.

These obstacles result from the failure to establish institutional decentralisation frameworks beforehand to accommodate climate projects in remote locations, which may jeopardise the project's success and create adverse incentives due to delays in fund disbursement caused by the centralisation of payments. They may also lead to serious governance issues, such as poor inter-institutional coordination among the entities involved in the programme⁴⁰. Thus, the success of REDD+ programmes depends on the existence and quality of governance structures that promote the transfer of power and the local communities' ownership of forest management⁴¹.

This case in Mozambique is typical of countries where centralisation has been masked by apparent decentralisation through weak pluralism, where the inclusion of multiple stakeholders serves, to a large extent, to meet the good governance requirements promoted by international agendas, without actually changing the real power structures⁴². In the case of REDD+ programmes, centralisation can hardly promote the changes in governance structures necessary for the decentralisation of natural resource management⁴³. Lack of inclusive participation may not only undermine the social legitimacy of the ZILMP, but may also compromise the long-term sustainability of the initiatives, since perceptions of injustice and exclusion can reduce the level of community engagement and trust in the implementing institutions.

1.4 Lack of budget transparency in the programme

The CBOs complained that they had not been given prior access to information regarding the financial amounts to which they would be entitled under the programme, thereby exposing a weakness in the communication and distribution of benefits. In the six districts analysed, it was found that 86.2% of CBO members were initially unaware of the amount to be received from the Carbon Funds, which reveals a pattern of opacity in the programme's financial management.

Uncertainty among local communities regarding how funds are disbursed can be explained, on the one hand, by the model adopted by ERPA for verifying reductions through independent entities, which typically tends to make it difficult to be certain about the funds to be processed. On the other hand, there is an unjustified lack of transparency, since communities have not been informed about the methods used to calculate

³⁹ He, G. *et al.* (2008). Distribution of economic benefits from ecotourism: A case of study of Wolong Nature Reserve for Giant Pandas in China. *Environment Management* 42: 1017-1025.

⁴⁰ Kashwan & Holahan (2014). Nested governance for effective REDD+: institutional and political arguments. *Igitur publisher*. Vol. 8, no 2 August, pp.554-575.

⁴¹ Anderson & Zerrif (2012). *Op. Cit.*

⁴² Forquilha, S. (2007). Remendo Novo em Pano Velho: O impacto das Reformas de Descentralização no Processo da Governação Local em Moçambique. Maputo: *IESE*.

⁴³ Anderson & Zerrif (2012). *Op. Cit.*

emissions and the criteria adopted by the FNDS for reducing the value of some OCB proposals without proper justification

It is essential that local communities have prior access to information on financial benefits, particularly for remote and low-income communities, where the predictability of income is a critical factor for participation and sustainability of initiatives. The omission of this information not only undermines the principle of transparency but also limits communities' ability to assess the real potential of REDD+ for mitigating inequalities⁴⁴.

In addition, 68.12% of CBO members stated that they did not have access to explanatory documents about the management and distribution mechanisms of the Carbon Funds, demonstrating a deficit in accountability. The limited information available on disbursements and the programme's implementation status was found exclusively on the FCPF website in English, which restricts access to information for local communities.

On the other hand, it was not possible to find financial reports on the FNDS institutional portal explaining how the Funds are used within the programme⁴⁵. One of the PDIZ staff members noted that the public and accessible availability of financial reports is an essential condition for ensuring social scrutiny and the legitimacy of the programme⁴⁶. He also pointed out that the process of regular monitoring of the programme's activities was hampered by a lack of transport and by the FNDS's poor dissemination of public information regarding the funding transferred by the donor⁴⁷. Participatory monitoring is a central pillar of REDD+ programme governance, as it enables the capture of local perceptions regarding the impacts of interventions, while strengthening social accountability mechanisms⁴⁸.

Of a total of USD 7.03 million allocated to the FNDS, the Programme Implementation Unit (PIU) and the PDIZ were to receive a total of USD 40,000 over five years, representing 0.57%. In other words, less than 1% of the funds were earmarked for monitoring field activities⁴⁹. This allocation is indicative of insufficient investment in governance and has implications for the success of this type of programme. In a context where monitoring of activities is ineffective, it may jeopardise the achievement of emission reduction targets by communities, as they may abandon initiatives because they do not feel accountable for them. In addition, poor monitoring of activities can significantly affect the sustainability of the environmentally friendly practices promoted by CBOs.

A member of the PDIZ reported negative impacts of the inadequate allocation of funds, noting that it is not possible to monitor the programme effectively without adequate resources. He also added that while resources are available for monitoring and other activities, accessing them has been challenging. More

⁴⁴ Tien, N., Jr & Thuy, P. (2017). Potential Impact of the REDD+ Program on Poverty Reduction in Nghe An Province, Vietnam. *Forest*.

⁴⁵ FNDS. (S/d). *Plano de Partilha de Benefícios*./[*Benefit-Sharing Plan*] <https://www.fnds.gov.mz/index.php/pt/nossos-projetos/listagem-de-projetos/21-desenvolvimento-sustentavel/232-plano-de-partilha-de-beneficios> [Accessed on 22 February, 2026].

⁴⁶ Information obtained from an interview with a member of the Integrated Development Platform, conducted on 12 November, 2025.

⁴⁷ Interview conducted on 12 November, 2025.

⁴⁸ FAO. (2026). *Forest Management Monitoring*. https://www.fao.org/sustainable-forest-management-toolbox/modules/forest-management-monitoring/en?utm_ [Accessed on 14 February, 2026, at 16.47].

⁴⁹ BSP (2019). *Op. Cit.*

support needs to be channelled to enable civil society to monitor the process as well⁵⁰. From an analytical perspective, these constraints demonstrate that the lack of budget transparency is not an isolated problem, but rather a symptom of broader governance weaknesses that simultaneously undermine the programme's effectiveness, equity and sustainability.


1.5 Misappropriation of some of the funds allocated to Forest Protection

Two unplanned activities were observed in the districts covered by the study, namely infrastructure and livestock farming, estimated at 14.4 million MT, which represents 21.65% of the funds approved at district level. However, despite the positive impact of these unscheduled activities for the development of local communities, the amount allocated may put at risk the achievement of goals for reducing CO2 emissions, as well as reveal a discrepancy between plans and implementation.

The addition of these project categories to the programme may reduce the programme's success rate, as no additional funding was provided for their implementation. Furthermore, the implementation of livestock farming also contributed to local communities' negative perception of the ZILMP's main objective.

The study found that the majority of respondents perceived the programme's main objective to be improving livelihoods (54%), followed by protecting the environment (39%) and creating jobs and sources of income (7%) (Figure 1). The lack of transparency regarding the programme's objectives led to frustration among local communities, as they understood the main objective to be improving people's living conditions.

Figure 2: Local communities' perceptions about the main objective of the programme



Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on data from the questionnaires

⁵⁰ Interview conducted on 12, November, 2025.

The categories defined for the selection process of community projects include: i) agriculture; ii) forest products other than timber; iii) nature-based tourism; and iv) fish farming⁵¹. Apart from the scope of the project, other activities have been added, such as livestock farming, small-scale construction works (infrastructure), the supply of school desks (Education), and sporting and cultural activities⁵².

An FNDS official reported that the decision to introduce categories not initially covered by the BSP was taken during the first call for proposals, in coordination with the World Bank, for the purpose of establishing social and economic categories, subject to participants' commitment to reduce emissions⁵³.

According to an MRV official from the FNDS, the inclusion of additional categories not covered by the BSP was intended to give local communities the freedom to choose projects in line with their needs. The official also stated that during this process, more rigorous criteria should have been applied in the selection of project categories for reducing emissions⁵⁴.

In terms of infrastructure, five projects were funded: three in the district of Pebane, one in Mocuba and one in Gilé. In the livestock sector, 10 projects were funded: six in the district of Gilé and four in Mocuba.

1. Infrastructure Projects

The infrastructure projects (image 1) include:

- Construction of a water supply system to benefit 20 families in the village of Veriha, in the Mugeba-Sede area, in the district of Mocuba. The construction of this infrastructure was estimated at 955,450.00 MT and was carried out by the company Rei Construções Limitada (Annex I).
- Construction of the Mulela Central Market, in the locality of Mulela, in Pebane. The project was budgeted at 1.7 million MT and was carried out by the company Jasin Uddin-Construções (Annex II)
- Construction of a maternity ward (*Casa mãe-espera*) in the locality of Mulela, in Pebane. This project was budgeted at 1.5 million MT and was carried out by the company Jasin Uddin-Construções (Annex III).
- Construction of a warehouse in the locality of Alto Ligonha, in the district of Gilé. The construction of the warehouse was carried out by the company Empreendimentos Rubi LDA, valued at 1.3 million MT (Annex IV).

⁵¹ BSP (2019). *Op. Cit.*

⁵² FNDS (2021, 29 November). Brochura BSP_OCBS. <https://www.fnds.gov.mz/index.php/pt/documentos/publicacoes/brochura-bsp-ocbs> [accessed on 17 February, 2026, at 12.55).

⁵³ Information obtained from an interview conducted on 13 October 2025.

⁵⁴ Information obtained from an interview with the MRV specialist at the FNDS, conducted on 21 May 2025.

- Rehabilitation of classrooms and the administrative block at Txalalane Primary School, in the locality of Txalalane, in the district of Pebane. This work was carried out by GUGULE- Comércio, Construção e Prestação de Serviços, at a cost of 1.4 million MT (Annex V).

Picture 1: Infrastructure financed by the programme for Winnua Wamulela Association in the district of Pebane (left: Mulela Central Market) and the CGRN in Veriha, Mocuba district (right: Veriha village water supply)



Source: Photo by the authors, 2025.

Contracts for the execution of the works were awarded through special public tenders, specifically via a competitive tendering process based on a price quotation, in accordance with Article 90 of Decree No. 5/2016 of 8 March. Under this procedure, the OCBs requested three quotations from different companies, and the lowest price quotation was awarded the contract. The process for evaluating the bids was the sole responsibility of the SDAE or the SDPI, depending on the district. However, during the field research, some irregularities were observed in the public procurement procedures that led to the construction of the water treatment plant, the market and the maternity ward.

According to a member of a CBO from Pebane, the company for the construction of this infrastructure was selected by a leader from the locality of Mulela. The leader's choice of the company raises doubts about the principles established under article 3 of decree no. 5/2016, of March 8⁵⁵, regarding legality, transparency, the right to competition for participating companies and the reasonableness of the decision taken by the evaluation jury. Furthermore, the winning company – Jasin Uddin-Construções – submitted two different proposals in the same construction tender, which raises serious suspicions about the legality of this contracting process.

A member of an association in Mulela reported that the contractor was selected after the funding had been secured. The OCB searched only for a local contractor and received only one quotation, from the company


⁵⁵ Decree No. 5/2016 of 8 March: approves the regulations governing the award of contracts for public works, the supply of goods and the provision of services to the State, and revokes Decree No. 15/2010, of 24 May.

Jasin Uddin-Construções⁵⁶, at district level. Under these circumstances, there are indications of a breach of Article 91 of Decree No. 5/2016 of 8 March, which stipulates that “*The criterion for evaluation and decision in a tender by quotations shall be the lowest evaluated price, from a minimum of three quotations submitted by the tenderers, taking into account the terms of reference defined for the subject matter of the contract*”. In addition to the infringement of Article 91, this case may also violate the principles of legality, competition and transparency established in the same decree, thereby calling into question the validity of the two competing companies in this process⁵⁷.

In relation to the water supply system, a member of the CGRN in Veriha, Mocuba, reported that the entire process of contracting companies was conducted by district officials due to the leader’s lack of knowledge regarding public procurement procedures⁵⁸ (Annex I). The district government, represented by the technical staff, by assuming the responsibility that was the OCB’s in the public procurement process, withdrew the leading role from this association, creating an obscure environment in which the criteria adopted by this institution for selecting bids and the interests involved in this process remain unknown.

Nevertheless, the communities beneficiary of the projects claim to have benefited from the construction of the infrastructure. Of this group, 58% stated that this improves access, 23% confirmed that the construction of the infrastructure created employment opportunities in the region, and 19% stated that the installation of this infrastructure had no impact on them (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Impacts of the infraestrutur projects in the host communities



Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on data from the questionnaires

⁵⁶ Interview with the vice-president of the Associação de Paz e Desenvolvimento, in Mulela, on 12 August 2025.

⁵⁷ Ibid, Art. 91.

⁵⁸ Information obtained through an interview with a CGRN member in Veriha, held on 14 September, 2025.

These results indicate that while the social projects do not contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions, they promote local development of the communities living around these infrastructures, through the improvement of their social infrastructures and creation of jobs.

1.5.2 Livestock

Poultry farming projects were budgeted at 4,118,790.00 MT in the district of Gilé and at 2,546,396.00 MT in Mocuba district, totaling 6,665,396.00 MT. These projects consisted of the breeding and marketing of chickens in the districts (Picture 2).

According to the Environmental and Social Safeguards Manager of the FNDS, the main idea in adding this category was to ensure that in exchange of these poultry farming projects, local communities would guarantee the sustainable management of native forests, through a declaration of commitment to reduce emissions in the region where the projects were implemented (Annex VI). Most of the CBOs funded in this category are close to the village, in a generally populated region with infrastructures around them. This fact leads to questioning the argument of protecting native forests, raising doubts about the potential of this category in reducing emissions.

Imagem 2: Poultry raising projects developed by the Cooperative Núcleo de Educadores Ambientais Tchaco Ndjaco in the district of Mocuba (left) and by the Associação das Mulheres Unidas de Gilé, in the district of Gilé (right).



Source: Photo by the authors, 2025.

1.6 Potential of the Carbon Market in Mozambique

The negotiated price of USD 5/tCO₂, under the ERPA, is well below the values traded in the international carbon markets. In the period between 2019 and 2024, the values practiced were USD 15-20/tCO₂ in the voluntary carbon market (Verra, Gold Standard) and USD 30-50/tCO₂ in the European compliance market (ETS). However, this difference represents an opportunity cost for Mozambique. By selling certified reductions to the FCPF instead of accessing alternative markets (Article 6 of the Paris Agreement Annex I), the country has failed to potentially receive two to four times more per ton reduced⁵⁹. This is a clear opportunity for Mozambique to explore its forestry potential to mobilise alternative revenues for the development of the sector (Table 6).

Table 6: Comparative opportunity cost of Carbon Market

Alternative Scenario	Unit Price (USD/tCO ₂)	Reductions verified (1,77 MtCO ₂)	Potencial Revenue
ERPA ZILMP (Completed)	5	1.769.807 tCO ₂	8,8 million USD
Voluntary Market for Afforestation, Reforestation and Vegetation	20.44	1.769.807 tCO ₂	36,1 million USD
Article 6 bilateral transfer	10	1.769.807 tCO ₂	17,7 million USD

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2025, based on data from the Forest Trends' Ecosystem Marketplace. Conferência das Partes (2015) e ERPA (2019).

The reductions actually verified (1.77 million tCO₂) have a revenue of USD 8.8 million, under the ERPA. In the voluntary market, the same volume would have potentially mobilised USD 36.1 million, four times more than the agreed value. Even in a conservative Article 6 scenario (USD 10/tCO₂), the revenue would be twice as high. These trade-offs offer the Government of Mozambique an opportunity to rethink alternative markets to leverage and institutionalise the carbon market.

Furthermore, the nature of ERPA contracts is characterised by being incomplete due to the long duration and complexity of the contractual business, allowing for immediate changes depending on the context of the contract. The incomplete nature of the contracts has implications for the negotiating capacity of the entity implementing the programme and opens space for the limited rationality of the actors involved⁶⁰.

The major problem with this type of contractual model is that it creates a grey area that tends to be filled by actors with power asymmetries, not by adaptive governance mechanisms. For example, due to the increase in deforestation in the reference year, in 2024, the World Bank revised the programme targets in order to accommodate the results. Therefore, the programme went from a target of reducing 10 million tCO₂ to a total of 1.7 million tCO₂. This case illustrates how the nature of the contracts can impact the programme's efficiency.

⁵⁹ World Bank (2024). State and Trends of Carbon Pricing. Washington, DC. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/carbon-pricing>

⁶⁰ Hart, O. (2016). Incomplete Contracts and Control. USA: Harvard University. <https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/hart-lecture.pdf>.

1.7 Disbursement of Funds to CBOs through channels not planned in the program

The allocation for carbon fund disbursements is divided as follows:

- 70% of the gains from reductions to local communities,
- 20% to the private sector,
- 2% to the Zambézia Provincial Government, 4% to the nine district governments, and 4% to the Gilé Reserve.

Disbursements of funds by district varied, with the district of Mocuba with the largest disbursement, 94%, followed by Pebane, 93%, Gilé, 88%, Ile, 64%, Mulevala, 46%, and Maganja da Costa, 43% (Table 7). Although the programme ended in 2025, disbursements from the first call for proposals are still being processed at the district level, and 129,343,121.10 MT relating to the second call for proposals is still pending disbursement.

Table 7: Disbursement of OCB funds by district

Districts	Approved Value (MT)	Total amount disbursed (MT)	Balance (MT)	%
Maganja da Costa	4.987.660,00	2.126.980,00	2.860.680,00	43
Pebane	15.528.583,34	14.380.393,86	2.163.963,91	93
Gilé	17.186.747,10	15.182.278,80	3.579.600,60	88
Ile	7.346.220,00	4.722.390,00	3.091.510,00	64
Mulevala	6.105.044,45	2.791.000,00	4.498.044,45	46
Mocuba	15.317.643,61	13.202.556,53	6.353.587,86	94
Total	66.471.898,50	52.405.599,19	14.066.299,31	80

Source: Data from SDPI (2025) and SDAE (2025).

The experience of managing forestry initiatives in Africa demonstrates that benefit-sharing in forest management has drawn attention to the challenges inherent to the capacity of governments to implement effective institutional arrangements for the distribution of financial benefits⁶¹.

The FCPF carbon funds were transferred to the designated accounts (DA-A and ERP) of the then Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), held at the Bank of Mozambique. In turn, the funds were paid by the MEF directly to the beneficiaries, in accordance with the BSP arrangements, using the State Financial Administration System (SISTAFE), upon request from the PIU⁶². According to the study, there were cases

⁶¹ Awung, N., e Marchant, R. (2020). Transparency in benefit sharing and the influence of community expectations on participation in REDD+ Projects: an example from Mount Cameroon Nation Park. *Ecosystems and People*.

⁶² Zakharenka (2025). *Op. Cit.*

of transfers made from the FNDS account via MTR (Real-Time Wholesale Transfer Settlement Subsystem)⁶³ to some CBOs and other in which the funds were transferred via SISTAFE to CBOs (Annex VII). This situation raises concerns since the funds were allocated to a specific account at the MEF, and the occurrence of cases where funds are disbursed from the FNDS account put in doubt the legality of the procedures adopted for their transfer.

The disbursement of funds through the FNDS account indicates compliance problems with the procedures previously established by the BSP. The funds should have been disbursed by the MF through SISTAFE⁶⁴. This situation constitutes a risk of misuse of funds, since the resources were sent through channels not previously established for this purpose.

Benefit-sharing processes in REDD+ implementing countries need to ensure that the sharing mechanisms are fair, including through the design of inclusive and understandable procedures for determining eligibility for benefits⁶⁵.

1.8 Lack of registration of some companies in the CTA database and financial discrepancies

Disbursements to companies ranged from 1,412,000.00 MT to 4,831,824.00 MT (Table 8). Among the companies awarded to the program, the one that received the highest amount was Farinha Sumaiya, in the Mocuba district.

Table 8: Disbursement of Carbon funds to awarded companies

Name of the District	District	Category	Total Amount Approved (MT)	Total Amount Discursed (MT)	%
Residencial Vila Maria Madalena	Maganja da Costa	Tourism – tourism resort	9.420.360,00	4.710.180,00	51
António Macaula	Gilé, locality of de Uape	Tourism – tourism resort	4.938.800,00	3.829.744,00	77
Martinho Ahemelano	Gilé, locality of Nanhope	Agro-processing: Warehouse	4.255.200,00	1.412.000,00	33
At Aviário	Gilé	Fish farming and Agro-processing	4.723.280,00	3.643.200,00	77
Casas de hospedagem Vilankulo	Mulevala	Tourism - accommodation	3.000.000,00	1.500.000,00	50
Casas Jamal	Mulevala	Tourism - accommodation	6.000.000,00	3.000.000,00	50
Farinha Sumaiya	Mocuba	Processing	11.967.600,00	4.831.824,00	40
Wood World	Mocuba	Forestry	10.885.947,20	4.015.948,16	37
Ovua loge	Mocuba	Tourism	5.000.000,00	2.000.000,00	40
Total			60.191.187,20	28.942.896,16	48

Source: Data from SDPI (2025) and SDAE (2025).

⁶³ This concerns real-time fund transfers, issued by commercial banks and processed transaction by transaction, through settlement accounts held at the Bank of Mozambique, as per Notice No. 4/GBM/2019, of March 8.

⁶⁴ FCPF. (2025). Information on the implementation of the benefit-sharing plan. Mozambique. FCPF

⁶⁵ Korwin, S. (2016). REDD+ and Corruption Risks for Africa's Forests: Case Studies from Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. *Transparency International*.

The private sector was represented by the CTA, through its provincial delegation in Zambézia. Within the ZILMP framework, the CTA's main function was to support sustainable development and facilitate access to financing for local companies, which represented about 20% of the benefits foreseen by the programme⁶⁶.

According to the CTA's Business Manager in Zambézia, there were limitations in the sharing of information related to the programme in the province, such as the absence of registration of the selected companies in the CTA's provincial database. This scenario indicates that there is a gap between the functions that the CTA should perform in the programme and its role in the programme's initiatives. On the other hand, the absence of the selected companies in the CTA database reveals possible interference in their nomination⁶⁷.

In addition, in the district of Mocuba, the study identified some discrepancies between the approved amounts and those allocated to the companies, as the amount approved was 22,282,838 MT, but it was allocated 27,853,547.20 MT⁶⁸, a value that exceeds 25% the approved. This discrepancy, without prior justification, raises questions about the management of the funds. The allocation of funds to companies in the district of Mocuba exceeding the planned amount, without proper justification, could lead to the capture of these funds by local elites. Only funds previously approved by the programme can be allocated to companies.

1.9 Prioritisation of disbursements to public institutions at the expense of local communities

Government institutions received the whole sum of the financial disbursements in an initial phase of the program, specifically in 2022 (Table 9). According to this data, 9,938,815.50 MT were transferred to district governments and 7,342,238.51 MT to the provincial government of Zambézia, while the Gilé National Reserve received 5,600,000.00 MT in 2023 and 8,800,000.00 MT in 2024, through the National Administration of Conservation Areas (ANAC), totaling 14,400,000.00 MT (Annex VIII). In total, these transfers amount to 31,681,054.01 MT⁶⁹.

⁶⁶ FCPF. (2018). Revised Emission Reductions Program Document (ER-PD): Zambezia Integrated Landscape Management Program. Mozambique: FCPF.

⁶⁷ Data obtained through an interview with the Business Manager of CTA Zambézia, António João António, conducted on September 25, 2025.

⁶⁸ FCPF. (2025). Report of Third-Party Monitoring of Benefit Sharing Plan Implementation of Zambézia Integrated Landscape Management Program in Mozambique. Mozambique: FCPF.

⁶⁹ FCPF (2022)

Table 9: Disbursements of carbon funds allocated to government institutions

Nr	Beneficiaries	Value Approved (MT)	Value disbursed (MT)	% Disbursed
1	District governments	9.938.815,50	MZN 9.938.815,50	100%
2	Provincial government	7.342.238,51	7.342.238,51	100%
3	Gilé National Reserve	14.400.000,00	14.400.000,00	100%
4	Total	31.681.054,01	31.681.054,01	100%

Source: FCPF (2022).

The full and early allocation of funds to public institutions contrasts with the treatment given to local communities, whose access to resources was conditioned to phased disbursements and subject to delays. This asymmetry raises doubts about the observance of the principle of equity in benefit-sharing, one of the fundamental pillars of REDD+ mechanisms⁷⁰.

The context in which public institutions benefit from all the funds while local communities have access to the funds in two tranches opens up opportunity for the perception of injustice and lack of equity in the benefit-sharing process among the programme beneficiaries. This situation not only compromises incentives for community participation but also weakens the operational principles of REDD+, which are based on co-responsibility and the active involvement of communities.

The benefit-sharing system for integrated programmes has been unfair and unequal, and this may lead to their reduced effectiveness. This result largely derives from inadequate benefit-sharing mechanisms and implementation problems⁷¹. Thus, developing a robust, transparent, and equitable system for sharing benefits remains a central challenge in the field of natural resource management, requiring greater institutional rigour and clarification of the criteria adopted. Failure to observe these criteria demonstrates an insufficient degree of institutional maturity, making it necessary to establish additional structures to ensure distributive justice and operational effectiveness⁷².

⁷⁰ Anderson & Zerrif (2012). *Op. Cit*

⁷¹ Kashwan & Holahan (2014). *Op. Cit*.

⁷² Ravikumar, A., Duchelle, A., Myers, R., Tovar, J. (2015). Multilevel governance challenges in transitioning towards a national approach for REDD+: evidence from 23 subnational REDD+ initiatives. *International Journal of the Commons* Vol. 9, no 2.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ZILMP has produced both positive and negative impacts. Despite the limited results achieved, the programme highlighted some positive impacts that represent opportunities for improving future carbon initiatives, namely increased knowledge about environmental conservation, the impact of deforestation and forest degradation, increased knowledge about social and environmental safeguards, diversification of income sources, improved food security, construction of public infrastructures to support communities, and the country's contribution to reducing CO₂ emissions.

The positive impacts highlight important lessons that can be used to improve the design, implementation, and transparency of future carbon programmes, particularly with regard to the effective inclusion of communities and the maximisation of local benefits.

In addition to the positive impacts, the implementation of ZILMP revealed weaknesses in the management of climate funds that compromise the transparency, fairness, and effectiveness of the planned benefit-sharing model. This study identified a lack of informed and effective participation of local communities in decision-making processes, associated with a strong centralisation of programme management.

In addition, it was found that there is a lack of transparency in the beneficiary selection process, characterised by the absence of clear, verifiable, and publicly accessible criteria, as well as the occurrence of conflicts of interest, what weakens the integrity and legitimacy of the process.

Inconsistencies were also found in the process of legalising CBOs, as well as weak female inclusion in the leadership of initiatives and in access to programme resources, thus limiting their participation in the management and benefits of the implemented interventions.

The study also revealed gaps in the budget transparency and financial management of the programme, highlighting evidence of misuse of some funds planned in the BSP (Basic Public Service Budget), disbursements made through channels not projected in the programme, the absence of registration of some beneficiary entities in the CTA database, discrepancies between the approved and actually allocated amounts, particularly in the Mocuba district, and a systematic prioritisation of resource allocation to public institutions to the detriment of local communities, contradicting the central principle of the ZILMP, which recognises communities as key actors in reducing deforestation and conserving forests.

The study results indicate that the absence of robust institutional mechanisms for transparency, accountability, and informed and effective community participation in the programme cycle compromised its ability to achieve the target of reducing a total of 10 million tCO₂ by the end of the programme. Only 1.7 million tCO₂ were generated in certified reductions, representing approximately 17.7% of the programme's overall target, what reveals a divergence between the formal design of ZILMP and its operationalisation on the ground. To mitigate these constraints, the following is recommended:

To the Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries (MAAP):

- Implementing a gender inclusion policy in all REDD+ programmes to mitigate cultural barriers, including the participation of women in decision-making processes;
- Institutionalising the Free, Informed and Prior Consent (FIP) as a mandatory and continuous requirement in all REDD+ programmes and carbon projects;
- Promoting digital governance and access to information, expanding civic space and reducing information asymmetries;
- Ensuring the harmonisation of ZILMP with the National Carbon Market Regulation, guaranteeing coherence with Article 6 and alignment with national legislation (land, forests, environment and decentralisation);
- Allowing CBO contracts to be signed by a representative of the FNDS at the provincial level and coordinate with the administrative court so that CBO contracts are endorsed in the province of Zambézia;
- Promoting effective administrative and fiscal decentralisation of resources through the transfer of funds to the management of the programme's Implementation Unit in Zambézia.

To National Fund for Sustainable Development (FNDS)

- Creating mechanisms to make the legalisation of CBOs more flexible, considering the local context;
- Creating a national platform for transparency in the carbon market, with information on projects, credits generated, prices, and benefits distributed;
- Ensuring the public dissemination of all information about the programme through the public portal, containing all calls for proposals, awards, and complemented by mandatory external audits;
- Guaranteeing full budget transparency, ensuring that communities have access to the total value of the projects and the criteria for calculating their benefits;
- Strengthening accountability and independent audit mechanisms, preventing deviations and irregularities in the allocation of resources;
- Strengthening transportation resources for conducting field monitoring;
- Providing technical and financial assistance to local communities to cover application costs;
- Involving communities throughout the programme cycle;
- Disseminating and making the Dialogue and Complaint Mechanism (DRM) effective.

To the District Secretariat for Economic Activities (SDAE) and the District Secretariat for Planning and Infrastructure (SDPI)

- Ensuring the public dissemination of all information about the programme, through the showcases of district services and the district government;
- Guaranteeing informed and effective participation of local communities in public consultation processes;
- Strengthening the application of the principle of legality and increasing awareness among public servants involved in the programme in respect to the law of public probity;
- Ensuring alignment between local implementation and national carbon market standards, including transparency and accountability requirements;
- Ensuring that benefit-sharing mechanisms respect customary rights and norms, avoiding exclusion and social conflicts;
- Guaranteeing the sustainability of the programme's good practices through training and capacity-building sessions for the funded CBOs, in order to ensure the adoption of these good practices in land use.

To the Zambézia Integrated Development Platform:

- Demanding accountability from the National Fund for Sustainable Development (FNDS) in respect to the use and allocation of funds directed to the Zambézia Integrated Development Platform;
- Publishing independent monitoring reports on the activities and financial execution of the programmes, contributing to public and transparent scrutiny;
- Strengthening the role of independent oversight, promoting regular and systematic monitoring of the programme's activities and financial flows;
- Participating in the creation of a carbon market transparency index jointly with civil society;
- Promoting awareness sessions about the scope of REDD+ programmes;
- Mobilising alternative funds from other cooperation partners to carry out monitoring and oversight work on field activities, reducing institutional dependence.

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6. ANNEXES

1.1. Proof of payments made to the winning bidder for the construction of a water supply system and the names of the other companies involved in the public tender. These receipts confirm the payment made by the OCB to the company Rei Construções.

REI CONSTRUÇÕES, LDA
 Av. Eduardo Mondlane
 Bairro. 3 de fevereiro
 Cidade de Mocuba
 Zambézia

RECIBO Nº 000120
 904.262,00 Mt

Recebi do Exmo Sr. Comite de Gestao de Recurso Natural Verinho

a quantia de: Novocentos e um mil duzentos e sessenta e dois mil'cais

Referente a Pagamento da factura nº 000504

Numerário
 T. Bancária
 Cheque Nº _____

PAGO
 19, 12/20 24

Assinatura [Signature]

Mocuba, 19 de Dezembro de 20 24

Mocuba, aos 16 de Janeiro de 2025

REI CONSTRUÇÕES, LDA
 Av. Eduardo Mondlane
 www.comercial@reiconstrucoes.co.mz
 Cell: 865022827
 Mocuba - Zambézia
 NUIT: 400 735 328

FACTURA Nº 000504

Exmo. (s). Sr. (s). Comite de Gestao de Recurso Natural de Verinho
 Morada Mocuba Nuit: 401.600.221

Otd.	Designação	Preço Unitário	Valor Total
45	sacos de cimento 50kg	650,00	29.250,00
6	carregada de areia	9.500,00	57.000,00
1000	teijolo	7,50	7.500,00
1	plumbeira	400,00	400,00
1	Fortevarre	160,00	160,00
1	pedras	28.700,00	28.700,00
2	Transporte	22.500,00	45.000,00
3	Homem de ajuda	16.500,00	49.500,00
Sub - Total			776.950,00
IVA 16%			124.312,00
Total			901.262,00

Motivo justificativo para não aplicação de IVA: _____

REI CONSTRUÇÕES, LDA
 AV. EDUARDO MONDLANE
 NUIT: 400735328

Dinheiro Cheque nº _____ T. Bancária Outro
 m de Facturação nº _____ Requisição nº _____

(Assinatura) [Signature]

Fornecedor proposto: **REI CONSTRUÇÕES**

Valor: 901.262,00Mt (Novecentos e um mil e duzentos Sessenta e dois meticais).

Prazo de execução dos serviços: Não exceder 15 dias após adjudicação.

DADOS DA PESQUISA: Foram enviados cartas-convites a 03 (três) concorrentes, os quais apresentaram as propostas abaixo:

Características / Especificações Técnicas do equipamento	Características / Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento		
	REI CONSTRUÇÕES	AGROCRIS SOCIEDADE UNIPESSOAL	AGRO TRADING E COMERCIO GERAL
Sacos de cimento de 50 kg	Sim	Sim	Sim
Carrada de área	Sim	Sim	Sim
Tijolos	Sim	Sim	Sim
Perfuração	Sim	Sim	Sim
Fontenária	Sim	Sim	Sim
Pedras	Sim	Sim	Sim
Transporte,	Sim	Sim	Sim
Homem de ajuda	Sim	Sim	Sim
VALOR DA PROPOSTA (MZN)	901.262,00	962.800,00	928.000,00

Observação (Se aplicável)

REI CONSTRUÇOES, LDA



NUIT: 400 735 328


AV. EDUARDO MONDLANE
Bairro. 3 de fevereiro
Cidade de Mocuba
Província de Zambezia
MOZAMBIQUE
Phone: +258 87 00 00 679

Termo de Entrega

A *Rei Construções, Lda*, sediada Cidade de Mocuba, Av Eduardo Mondlane, Bairro 3 Fevereiro, província de Zambézia, Titular do NUIT n° 400 735 328, contactável pelos n°: 870000679, representada pelo Sr. Raison Chilabade Chauluka, declara ter entregue o furo de agua com a fontenaria (Djiga Djiga) a Cooperativa de Gestão de Recursos Naturais de Veriha, com o Nuit: 401600221, em bom estado e funcional.

Sendo isso verdade este termo de entrega vai assinada e carimbada com tinta óleo existente na empresa.

Mocuba, aos 16 de Janeiro de 2025



Recebido

Ricardo Alberto

1.2. Proof of payments made to the winning bidder for the construction of a market and the names of the other companies that participated in the tender. These receipts confirm the payment made by the OCB to the contractor, as well as the suspicion of rent-seeking practices by the company JASIM UDDIN, whose name appears twice in the same tender with different values.

JASIM UDDIN - CONSTRUÇÕES
De: Jasim Uddin
Cell: 86 793 1239 / 607 1240
Bairro Cimento
Mocubela - Zambézia
Nuit: 401 904 621

RECIBO Nº 00004

156.000,00 MT

Recebi do Exmo Sr. ASSOCIAÇÃO WINNULA WA
MULELA - PEBANE

a quantia: SETECENTOS E CINQUENTA E SEIS MIL
RETCIAIS

Referente a PAGAMENTO DAS FACTURAS Nº 02 e 03

Numerário
 2026/02/21 13:32
 E 38,2 S. 17,3º

Mocubela, 26 de Agosto de 2025

JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES
Assinado em 2025/08/26
[Signature]

Infinix HOT 60 Pro+

IVA 16%.....
Total.....

Gráfica - Qualitane NUIT: 400063362 Licença Nº 30 MPF 01/2022

Características/Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento	CARACTERÍSTICAS/ESPECIFICAÇÕES TÉCNICAS DO EQUIPAMENTO		
	JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES	CECÍLIA MÁRIO NEVES	JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES
Chapas IBR	Sim	Sim	Sim
Tomadas	Sim	Sim	Sim
Interruptores Duplo	Sim	Sim	Sim
Caixa de Derivação	Sim	Sim	Sim
Disjuntores	Sim	Sim	Sim
Fios Eléctricos/metros (rolos)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Lâmpadas	Sim	Sim	Sim
Fechaduras	Sim	Sim	Sim
Aros de Janelas	Sim	Não	Não
Aro de Portas	Sim	Sim	Sim
Contra Placado	Sim	Sim	Sim
Portas	Sim	Sim	Sim
Cadeiras	Sim	Sim	Sim
Betume/kg	Sim	Sim	Sim
Construção de Mercado	Sim	Sim	Não
Carpinteiro	Sim	Sim	Não
VALOR DA PROPOSTA (MZM)	756.000,00	762 175,00	763 375,00
Observação (Se aplicável)			
Observações (Se aplicável)			

2026/02/21 13:40:

JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES

Valor: 756.000,00 MZM (Setecentos e Cinquenta e Seis Mil Meticais).

E 38,2 S 17,3

Prazo de execução dos serviços: Não exceder 15 dias após adjudicação.

Infinix HOT 60Pro+

CONTRATO SIMPLICADO DE EMPRETEIRO

Contrato Número:

Contrato para realização de trabalho de Construção de Mercado no Povoado de Mutacane do projecto BSP/REDD+ nas Comunidades da Paisagem da Zambézia.

Caro Sr/a: **JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES (Nuit – 401904621)**

Temos o prazer de informar que o projecto BSP - Escritório do FNDS – Delegação da Zambézia concordou em oferecer-lhe um contrato para **Construção de Mercado** de projectos sociais no âmbito do Programa BSP/REDD+ nas comunidades da paisagem da Zambézia.

Os termos e as condições associadas a duração do contracto são as seguintes:

1. DURAÇÃO DO CONTRATO

Data de início: 01 de Agosto de 2025

Data de término: 30 de Dezembro de 2025

2. ACTIVIDADES

2.1. A actividade a ser realizada neste acordo consiste na Construção de Mercado na Comunidade de Mutacane, Localidade de Mulela Sede com objectivo de contribuir para troca de bens e serviços na comunidade rural para o bem-estar social através de implementação de projectos comunitários que contribuem para a redução do desmatamento florestal, durante um período de 05 meses, nas comunidades alvo do projecto BSP na paisagem da Zambézia.

3. COMPENSAÇÕES

3.1. Para o desempenho satisfatório do "Trabalho", será pago um valor total bruto equivalente a 555.700,00 MZN.

4. CONDIÇÕES DE PAGAMENTOS

4.1. O valor será pago na sua totalidade (100%) após conclusão satisfatória do serviço.

17. ASSINATURA

Para confirmar a aceitação dos termos e condições do presente Acordo, incluindo os termos e condições do presente acordo, por favor assine ambos os originais deste contrato no espaço indicado abaixo e rubrique todas as páginas.

Assinatura Presidente da Associação,

Francisco Francisco
Pessoa responsável do BSP Comunitário

Aceite por,

Eu, JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES, concordo com os termos e condições acima,

2026/02/21 13:39

E 38,2 S. 173

Assinatura: _____

Data: 01.09.2025

Infinix HOT60Pro+

1.3. Proof of payments made to the winning bidder for the construction of a maternity ward and the names of the other companies that participated in this public tender.

CECIL
ome

JASIM UDDIN - CONSTRUÇÕES
Cell: 82 837 3440
Bairro: Cimento
Mocubela - Zambézia
Nuit: 111 289 435

COTACÃO

RECIBO Nº 00004

180.000,00 MT

Recebi do Exmo Sr. Associação Paz e Desenvolvimento de Mulela Sede

a quantia: Seitocentos e oitenta Mil Meticals

Referente a Pagamento de Facturas Nº 51/52/53

Numerário
 T.Bancária
 Cheque Nº _____

Mocubela, 01 de Março de 2024

PAGO
01/03/2024

Assinatura
JASIM UDDIN

Encomenda

Gráfica - Qualimane NUIT: 40006382 Licença Nº 30 MPF 81/2022

Localização Total: ... ZAMBEZIA

JASIM UDDIN - CONSTRUÇÕES
Cell: 82 837 3440
Bairro: Cimento
Mocubela - Zambézia
Nuit: 111 289 435

RECIBO Nº 00056

815.000,00 MT

Recebi do Exmo Sr. Associação Paz e Desenvolvimento de Mulela Sede

a quantia: Oitocentos e quinze Mil Meticals

Referente a Pagamento das Facturas Nº 6/8 e 9.

Numerário
 T.Bancária
 Cheque Nº _____

Mocubela, 01 de Junho de 2024

PAGO
01/06/2024

Assinatura
JASIM UDDIN

Dinheiro Cheque Nº _____ Outro

Item de Facturação Nº _____ Requisição Nº _____

Total

JASIM UDDIN CONSTRUÇÕES

DADOS DA PESQUISA: Foram enviados cartas convites a 03 (três) concorrentes, os quais apresentaram as propostas abaixo:

Características/Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento	Características/Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento		
	JASIM UDDIN	CECILIA MARIO NEVES	JAHAN COMERCIAL
Botas de Boracha (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Pa (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Catanas (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Carinha de Mão (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Luvas (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Capacetes (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Fita Métrica / 50m	Sim	Sim	Sim
Colher de Pedreiro (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Escopio (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Fio de Prumo(m)	Sim	Não	Não
Esquadro (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Martelo (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Régua (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Sunpina (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Enchadas (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Baldes (und)	Sim	Sim	Não
Pregos (kgs)	Sim	Sim	Nao
Longarinas (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Barrotes (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Sacos de Cimentos (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Vidros 2.5 mm (und)	Sim	Sim	Sim
Cal 50 kgs	Sim	Sim	Sim
Tinta Plástica / Litros	Sim	Sim	Sim
Tinta Óleo / Litros	Sim	Sim	Sim
Arcia (tons)	Sim	Sim	Sim

6.4 Proof of the payments made to the winning bidder of the tender for the construction of a warehouse and the names of the other companies that participated in this tender. Only the first bank transfer made to the company Empreendimentos RUBI Ltd Zambézia is presented.

DADOS DA PESQUISA: foram enviados cartas-convites a 03 (três) concorrentes, os quais apresentaram as propostas abaixo:

Características / Especificações Técnicas do equipamento	Características / Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento		
	EMPREENDIME-NTOS RUBI LTD Zambézia	Jorge Mariano Empreiteiro Construção Civil Nampula	VANI CONSTRUCOES Nampula- Moçambique
Construção de Um Armazém (15*8) m	Sim	Sim	Sim
VALOR DA PROPOSTA (MZN)	1.381.178,00	1.696.095,00	1.762.420,00

Observação (Se aplicável)

Apreciadas as cotações, a cotação com menor valor foi de **1.381.178,00 MZN (Um milhão trezentos e oitenta um mil e cento setenta e oito meticais)**; que apesar de seleccionada, a associação adjudicou o valor de **672.964,00 MZN (Seiscentos e Setenta dois mil e novecentos sessenta e quatro meticais)** que corresponde a primeira tranche a ser transferida para a empresa construtora, para execução das actividades iniciais de acordo as especificações Técnicas. O Remanescente será canalizado em função do nível de execução da obra.

BCI - EXTRACTO ELECTRONICO

BALCÃO 101-AGENCIA ALTO-MOLOQUE
 CONTA 23315861010001 - ASSOCIACAO DE AGRICULTORES
 OLIMA INTITI
 MOEDA MZN
 DATA INÍCIO 26-11-2023
 DATA FIM 06-02-2024

1. Para movimientos à débito e crédito

Data de Movimento	Descritivo de Movimento	Valor do Movimento	Saldo Após Movimento	Data valor	Número de Documento
27-11-2023	TRANSF. STF ORD.MOF000100398722 3MZN	692.964,00	693.214,00	27-11-2023	360014693
28-11-2023	Chq. Caixa 48036034	-20.000,00	673.214,00	28-11-2023	359669612
04-12-2023	Dep.Num. 718379021	200,00	673.414,00	04-12-2023	361122665
04-12-2023	TRANS REF:EMPREENHIMENTO S RUBI LDA	-672.900,00	514,00	04-12-2023	361132231
04-12-2023	Comissão/Despesas de TEI 361132231	-441,18	72,82	04-12-2023	361132231
04-12-2023	Imposto de Selo sobre Comissão	-8,82	64,00	04-12-2023	361132231
	SALDO CONTABILISTICO:		64,00		
	SALDO DISPONÍVEL:		64,00		

26-11-2023 359669612
 04-12-2023 361122665
 04-12-2023 361132231

ENTOS SA

DE: Associação de Agricultores Olima Intiti

Gilé

NOTA DE ADJUDICAÇÃO

PARA: EMPREENDIMIENTOS RUB LDA- Zambézia Moçambique

Gilé aos, 29 de Novembro de 2023

Nota nº 03/CBP-OCB/2023 – Fornecimento de Serviços para construção de Armazém (15*8)m

Exmos. Senhores,

Foi concluída a avaliação das cotações submetidas para o concurso acima referido e com base nos critérios de menor preço cotado a Associação de Agricultores Olima Intiti, vem informar que a vossa empresa foi selecionada para construção de um **Armazém de 15*8 m** de acordo com o especificado no documento de concurso, nas seguintes condições.

Item	Descrição	Und	Qtd
1	Construção do Armazém de 15*8 m	und	01

Neste contexto foi aprovado a empresa **EMPREENDIMIENTOS RUBI LDA – Zambézia Moçambique** por apresentar a proposta com o valor mais baixo e cumprindo com as especificações técnicas do concurso, num valor global de **MZN 1.381.178,00 Mts**. Deste já expressar a gratidão pela vossa participação e contamos com a vossa colaboração nas próximas ocasiões.

Sem mais do momento endereçamos as nossas cordiais saudações

Gilé, aos 29 de Novembro de 2023

Bernard

(Associação de Agricultores Olima Intiti)



6.5 Proof of payments made to the winning bidder for the rehabilitation of classrooms and the administrative block of the Tlalalane Basic School, and the names of the other companies that participated in this tender.

CUGULE
Comercio, Construções e Prestação de Serviço
De: Omar Lopes Cugule
Cell: 875529861
Pebane - Sede
NUIT: 122 532 372

RECIBO
Nº 000015
#1.912.500,00 MT

Recebi do Exmo Sr. ASSOCIAÇÃO DOS CAMPONESES DE
TXALALANE

a quantia de: Um milhão e Quatrocentos e Doze
Mil e Quinhentos Meticais

Referente a Pagamento das Facturas Nº 36/37

Numerário
 T. Bancária
 Cheque Nº _____

Pebane, 14 de Junho de 2024

PAGO
Assinatura
Omar L. Cugule

PEBANE

UGULE
 Comercio, Construções e Prestação de Serviço
 De: Omar Lopes Cugule
 Cell: 875529861
 Pebane - Sede
 NUIT: 122 532 372

Factura
 Nº 000036

Pebane, 14 de Junho de 2024

Exmo. (s). Sr. (s) **ASSOCIAÇÃO DOS CAMPONESES DE TXALALANE**
 Morada **PEBANE**Nuit: **700229815**

Qtd.	Designação	Preço Unitário	Valor Total
01	Pagamento Pintura do Bloco	22 500 00	22 500 00
01	Pagamento Colocação de Chapas de Zinco IBZ	15 000 00	15 000 00
02	Pagamento Montagem de Portas e Janelas	25 000 00	50 000 00
01	Pagamento Eng. Civil	25 000 00	25 000 00
02	Pagamento Fiscal	20 000 00	40 000 00

Motivo justificativo da não aplicação do imposto

Total..... 152 500 00

Dinheiro Cheque nº..... T. Bancarra

Ordem de Facturação nº.....

Requisição nº.....



Omar Lopes Cugule
 (Assinatura)

	equipamentos e prestação de serviços de qualidade e especificações técnicas.		
DADOS DA PESQUISA: Foram enviados cartas convites a 03 (três) concorrentes, os quais apresentaram as propostas abaixo:			
Características/Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento	Características/Especificações Técnicas do Equipamento		
	CUGULE Comércio, Construções e Prestações de Serviços	Mocleve Multi Service	Planeta Multiservice
Chapas de Zinco IBR	Sim	Sim	Sim
Barrotes	Sim	Sim	Sim
Tinta de Pintura	Sim	Sim	Sim
Equipamento Mobiliário para Bloco Administrativo	Sim	Sim	Sim
Equipamento Informático para Bloco Administrativo	Sim	Sim	Sim
Sistema Eléctrico por Painéis Solares	Sim	Sim	Sim
Pintura do Bloco	Sim	Sim	Sim
Colocação de Chapas de Zinco	Sim	Não	Não
Montagem de Portas e Janelas	Sim	Sim	Sim
Engenheiro de Construção Civil	Sim	Sim	Sim
Fiscais	Sim	Sim	Sim
VALOR DA PROPOSTA (MZM)	1.412.500,00	1.423.000,00	1.438.000,00
Observação (Se aplicável) Observações (Se aplicável)			
<p>Fornecedor proposto: CUGULE, Comércio, Construções e Prestação de Serviço</p> <p>Valor: 1.412.500,00 MZM (Um Milhão e Quatrocentos e Doze Mil e Quinhentos Meticais).</p> <p>Prazo de execução dos serviços: Não exceder 15 dias após adjudicação.</p>			

6.6 Sample application form for CBOs containing the declaration of commitment to reducing emissions.

FNDS
FORMULÁRIO CANDIDATURA ORGANIZAÇÕES COMUNITÁRIAS DE BASE - PLANO DE PARTILHA DE BENEFÍCIOS

Valor Total	720,500	100%
Valor solicitado-FSP	720,500	100%
Contribuição da OCB (se aplicável)		
Outros (se aplicável)		

DECLARAÇÃO

Eu, Antonio Mariano representante da OCB Okukela Okawa com Sede no Distrito de _____, declaro sob compromisso de honra, que a OCB que representa não está a ser apoiada financeiramente por outras instituições para mesmas actividades a qual nos candidatamos no presente edital e afirmamos que as informações por nós prestadas e constantes do documento de candidatura, são verdadeiras e autênticas.

Estamos cientes que através deste documento assumimos igualmente, o compromisso de não desvirtuar e contribuir para o processo de redução de emissões, e que a falsidade destas declarações configura a desclassificação da nossa candidatura.

Nada mais a declarar e cientes das responsabilidades pelas declarações prestadas, firmamos a presente.

Mocimbo, 20 de 12 de 2021

ANEXOS

Todos os candidatos devem anexar os seguintes documentos ao formulário de candidatura:

1. Carta de solicitação de financiamento ao FNDS.
2. Estatuto da OCB.
3. Certidão de legalização.
4. FORMULÁRIO DE CANDIDATURA E PLANO DE INVESTIMENTO com projecções sobre os custos dos projectos a implementar.
5. Declaração do Distrito (confirma a presença da OCB no território).
6. Credencial da OCB que atribui o mandato ao seu representante junto ao FNDS.
7. Cópia do documento de identificação do representante da OCB (BI)

6.7 The methods of money transfer made to the OCBs

The method of money transfer was carried out via the Webbank of the former Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Millennium
bim

ASSOC MUHINVIUHE IMPACA
IMPACA
IMPACA

Histórico de Movimentos de Conta à Ordem Demand Deposit Account Transaction History

Data de Emissão: 06-05-2025
Issue Date
Período: 01-04-2025 - 06-05-2025
Period

**Dados de Cliente
Customer Data**

Nome: ASSOC MUHINVIUHE IMPACA
Name
Balcão: PEBANE
Branch
NUT: 401451961
Morada do Balcão: RUA 26 DE OUTUBRO ZAMBEZIA
Branch Address

**Dados da Conta
Account Data**

Número: 765179845
Number
Produtor: DDA STAND ORG COURES MZM
Product
Moeda da Conta: MZN
Account Currency
Balcão: PEBANE
Branch
Saldo Disponível: 200.050,00
Available Balance
Saldo Inicial: 9.450,00
Initial Balance


NIB: 000100000076517984557
IBAN: MZ59000100000076517984557
SWIFTCODE: BIMOMZMZ
Morada do Balcão: RUA 26 DE OUTUBRO RUA PRINCIPAL
Branch Address
Saldo disponível à data de emissão do documento.
Available balance at the date of issue of this document
Saldo Final: 200.050,00
Final balance

**Movimentos
Transactions**

Data da Transacção Transaction Date	Data Valor Value Date	Descrição Description	Debito Debit	Crédito Credit	Saldo Inicial Initial Balance	Saldo Balance
02-05-2025	02-05-2025	MIN EC FIN 35A006052250000308 000498444825MZN MIN EC FIN 0000022104102510015 Ministério das Finanças 250502191516167 WB WEBBANK MW		190.600,00	9.450,00	200.050,00

~~Millennium bim
Pebane~~

Money transfers made via SISTAFE, as planned in the program




Some bank transfers from the FNDS account to the OCBs via MTR

BCI
ESKILGAG 200-CENTRO INTEGRADO DE NEGOCIOS DE MOCUBA
CONTA 25202724410001 - COOPERATIVA GES REC NATURAIS
MUAGONOVE
MOEDA MZN
DATA INÍCIO 01-07-2024
DATA FIM 06-09-2024

1. Para movimentos à débito e crédito

Data de Movimento	Descrição de Movimento	Valor do Movimento	Saldo Após Movimento	Data valor	Número De Operações
03-09-2024	MTR BIM ORD. FUNDO NAC DESEN SUSTENTAVEL	454.708,22	454.808,22	03-09-2024	569025399

SALDO CONTABILISTICO: 454.808,22
SALDO DISPONÍVEL: 454.808,22


BANCO COMERCIAL E DE INVESTIMENTOS, SA

Banco Comercial e de Investimentos, SA
Av. 25 de Setembro, nº4 | Caixa Postal 4745 | Maputo - Moçambique | Tel.: +258 21 353 700 | Fax: +258 21 307 152
Capital Social: MZN 10.000.000.000,00 | NUIT: 400001391 | Nº Matricula na CRC de Maputo 8571
www.bci.co.mz

6.8 Budget of the funds of Gilé National Reserve. The budgeting of the funds allocated to this Reserve differs from the approved amount and register a sharp decrease in the budgeted value.



REPÚBLICA DE MOÇAMBIQUE

MINISTÉRIO DA TERRA E AMBIENTE
ADMINISTRAÇÃO NACIONAL DAS ÁREAS DE CONSERVAÇÃO

Ao
Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Sustentável- FNDS

Nota nº 24 /MTA/ANAC/GD/300/2022 Maputo, 23 de Fevereiro de 2022

ASSUNTO: Envio da Matriz do Modelo 7, preenchida no âmbito do Programa de Redução de Emissões no Parque Nacional de Gilé, Província da Zambézia

Exmo Senhor,

Acusamos a recepção da vossa nota com a Ref. nº 73/FNDS/GPCA/012.2/2022, na qual solicita o preenchimento e envio do modelo 7 referente ao pagamento de \$232,539.31 (Duzentos e trinta e dois mil, quinhentos e trinta e nove dólares e trinta e um cêntimo) ao Parque Nacional do Gilé no âmbito do acordo de pagamento por Reduções de Emissões (ERPA – Emission Reductions Payment Agreement) com o Banco Mundial, sobre o qual apresentamos o seguinte:

1. Foi desenvolvida, em coordenação com Parque Nacional de Gilé, uma proposta de actividades e respectivo orçamento dentro do acima definido, o que permitiu o preenchimento da matriz do Modelo 7, conforme solicitado.
2. A priorização de acções, tomou como base o facto de estar relacionada com o REDD*, e contribuir para a redução do desmatamento na zona tampão do parque.

Assim, junta-se a presente nota a matriz do Modelo 7 devidamente preenchida (Meticais e Dólares).

Com os melhores cumprimentos



Rua da Resistência, número 1746/1747, 8 andar - Maputo - Moçambique
Telefone: +258 82 0662677
geral@anac.gov.mz

Metodologia de Elaboração do Orçamento-Programa								
Meta Financeira								
Modelo EXCLUSIVO para Projectos de Investimento								
Preencher um Modelo para Cada Fonte de Recurso de Cada Projecto de Investimento								
Projecto Orçamental								Modelo 07
Órgão ou Instituição		Código	Designação					
Se Provincial, indicar a Província			ANAC - Administração Nacional das Áreas de Conservação					
Se Distrital, indicar a Província e o Distrito			Província - Zâmbia					
			Distrito Pebaari					
Projecto Orçamental:		Código	Designação					
Designação			PRE-FNDS					
Função								
Fonte de Recurso (FR)			103ANACIPOLA					
Localização								
Província			Zâmbia					
Distrito			Pebane, Cuito					
Posto Administrativo								
Localidade								
Meta Financeira (Preencher uma ficha para cada FR)								
Classificação Económica da Despesa								
Código	Descrição	Ano 0	Ano1		Ano2	Ano3	Seguintes	Unidade: Mil MT
			Dentro Limite	Excesso				
100000	Despesas Correntes		10697000,00					
110000	Pessoal							
111000	Salários e Remunerações		850 000,00					
111100	Pessoal Civil							
112000	Demais Despesas com o Pessoal							
112100	Pessoal Civil							
112101	Ajudas de Custo Dentro do País para Pessoal Civil		1.000.000,00					
112102	Ajudas de Custo Fora do País para Pessoal Civil							
120000	Bens e Serviços		8847000,00					
121000	Bens		1.147.000,00					
121001	Combustíveis e Lubrificantes		2.500.000,00					
122000	Serviços		5.000.000,00					
127001	Comunicações		200.000,00					
140000	Transferências Correntes							
141000	Transferências Correntes a Administrações Públicas							
141003	Direitos Aduaneiros Correntes							
141004	Impostos Indirectos Correntes							
141005	Transferências Correntes a Embaixadas							
141099	Outras Transferências Correntes a Administrações Públicas							
143000	Transferências Correntes a Famílias							
143400	Demais Transferências às Famílias							
143401	Bolsas de Estudo no país							
143402	Bolsas de Estudo no Exterior							
143499	Outras Transferências às Famílias							
200000	Despesas de Capital		4000000,00					
210000	Bens de Capital							
211000	Construções							
212000	Maquinaria, Equipamentos e Mobiliários							
213000	Meios de Transporte		4.000.000,00					
214000	Demais Bens de Capital							
220000	Transferências de Capital							
221000	Transferências de Capital a Administrações Públicas							
221001	Transferências de Capital a Instituições Autónomas							
221002	Transferências de Capital a Autarquias							
221003	Direitos Aduaneiros de Capital							
221004	Transferências de Capital a Embaixadas							
221005	Impostos Indirectos de Capital							
222000	Transferências de Capital a Administrações Privadas							
222001	Transferências de Capital a Partidos Políticos							
222099	Outras Transferências de Capital a Administrações Privadas							
223000	Transferências de Capital a Famílias							
224000	Demais Transferências de Capital							
224001	Transferências de Capital a Sociedades							
224002	Transferências de Capital ao Exterior							
224099	Outras Transferências de Capital							
240000	Demais Despesas de Capital							
240002	Outras Despesas de Capital							
Total (100000+200000)			14697000,00					
Elaborado por: Antonio Chilenge			Aprovado por: Sergio Alexandre Covane					
Categoria/Função: Técnico de Planificação, Monitoria & Avaliação			Categoria/Função: Directora dos Serviços de Planificação, cooperação e estudos					
Ass: <i>Antonio Chilenge</i> 16/02/2022			Ass: <i>Sergio Alexandre Covane</i> 16/02/2022					


Modelo EXCLUSIVO para Projectos de Investimento

O Modelo não se aplica a:

- Despesas Gerais de Funcionamento (OF-00) de qualquer órgão ou instituição;
- OF's Distritais (OF-00 e os restantes OF's Distritais);
- Actividades Específicas



CENTRO DE INTEGRIDADE PÚBLICA
Boa Governação - Transparência - Integridade



WAVERLEY ST FOUNDATION